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Purpose: This thesis intends to contribute to research by evaluating how the market responds 
to the announcement of a CBM&A transaction for acquiring shareholders and  examining the 
extent to which macroeconomic & cultural factors influence shareholder value creation as 
well as whether there are any differences between developed and developing countries. 
 
Methodology: A quantitative event study with a deductive approach is performed where the 
announcement of a CBM&A transaction is investigated during two event windows, [-2, 2 and 
-5, 5] to examine if abnormal returns exist. Multiple linear regressions are carried out to find a 
relation between abnormal returns and macroeconomic, explanatory variables.  
 
Theoretical perspective: The main theoretical frame is the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the 
Signaling theory and theories regarding M&A and CBM&A including motives and factors 
affecting shareholder wealth. Previous relevant studies are emphasized.  
 
Empirical foundation: A quantitative assembly of data has been collected to examine the 
abnormal returns over two event windows [-2, 2 and -5, 5] for CBM&A transactions during 
1997-2012 on foreign targets. The acquirers are listed on the London Stock Exchange.   
 
Conclusions: The authors cannot generally distinguish any abnormal returns in connection 
with CBM&A announcements for the event windows. The research cannot also find any 
significant relationships between abnormal returns and macroeconomic & cultural factors. 
Needless to say, there are still significant differences for these variables between developed 
and developing countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by introducing the reader to the general mergers and acquisitions 
subject, which characteristics influence value creation for acquirers and the purpose of 
investigating macroeconomic and cultural factors in relation to cross-border deals. To 
conclude, demarcations, intended audience and outline of the remaining thesis are presented. 
 
1.1 Background 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a way for companies to expand their business into foreign 
markets. The majority of FDI belongs to cross-border M&A activity, peaking at over eighty 
percent in 1999 according to UNCTAD (2000). With a constantly growing globalization, 
Cross-Border Merger & Acquisitions (CBM&A) are gaining in importance. The global 
CBM&A value increased from $200 billion in 1990 to $1637 billion in 2007 (Sudarsanam, 
2010).  
Diagram 1 - Global foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) in the period 1992-
2007. 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Due to the amount invested and its strategic importance for firms, the interest in M&A 
research has grown immensely. The M&A activity subsided in connection with the most 
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recent financial crisis, however, new research has shown that the M&A activity is on the rise 
again. A study involving 868 corporate managers performed by McKinsey, highlights the 
importance of M&A as a means to grow and create value (Uhlaner & West, 2011). In 
connection with increased research, interest the variety of questions related to M&A has 
expanded. Questions such as, why M&A exists, which motives drive the activity, whether it 
creates value and if so which factors affect value creation are commonly asked. It is in 
particular the latter question which has dominated research attention, does M&A create value 
and if so, whether it is the shareholders of acquiring or target firm who benefit from the 
transaction. Previous research has provided a mixture of results; however, the majority of 
research agrees on that it is the shareholders of the target firm who benefit from M&A 
transactions, whereas the shareholders of the acquiring firm in general do not experience any 
effect (Gaughan, 2007). Seth (1990) argues those firms who utilize resources optimally to 
enhance productivity under current environmental restraints and opportunities are those that 
maximize the value creation process.  
In an M&A setting, the foundation for value creation is the combination of the merging firms’ 
resources and the situational opportunities and constraints. The ability for two or more firms 
to generate greater value as a single entity rather than separately, is often referred to as 
synergy (Goold and Campbell, 1998). Researchers have been able to conclude a range of 
characteristics, which affect value creation; industrial diversification (Doukas, Holmen & 
Travlos, 2002; Flanagan, 1996), relative size of the deal (Asquith, Bruner & Mullins 1983; 
Gupta & Misra, 2007; Bieshaar, Knight & van Wassenaer, 2001; Moeller, Schlingemann & 
Stulz, 2004), method of payment (Asquith et al., 1983; Yook, 2003), previous experience of 
acquirer (Fuller, Netter & Stegemoller, 2002; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), attitude of 
transaction (Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007) and pre-bid performance of acquirer (Rau & 
Vermaelen, 1998; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003). 
All the aforementioned characteristics also hold for cross-border deals. These characteristics 
are described in Cross-border M&A (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath & Pisano, 2004; Doukas & 
Travlos, 1988). Since the national conditions between countries differ a great deal, the 
authors’ contribution to the research is to investigate the effects of macroeconomic and 
cultural factors in CBM&A as a compliment to previous studies on acquiring shareholder 
value creation. Furthermore, these macroeconomic and cultural differences will be compared 
based on the target country’s stage of development. 
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To better illustrate how the authors intend to contribute to past research, the characteristics 
affecting value creation have been divided into different categories i) macroeconomic and 
cultural factors ii) firm factors iii) deal factors iv) geographical diversification v) industrial 
diversification. As mentioned, this thesis focuses on macroeconomic and cultural factors 
whilst controlling for the remaining variables, as shown in Diagram 2. 
Diagram 2 – Examined factors affecting value in CBM&A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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1.2 Problem discussion 
Over the years, managers’ ambitions to realize synergies and growth have caused some of the 
largest failures in corporate history, such as AOL Time Warner and HP Compaq. Perhaps one 
of most infamous CBM&A deals, referred to as “Transatlantic car crash”, took place in May 
1998 when Daimler-Benz agreed to acquire one of Detroit’s big three automakers, Chrysler, 
at a deal originally valued at a staggering $40 billion. Nine years and billions of dollars of 
losses later, Chrysler was sold off for a mere $6 billion (Bloomberg Businessweek). The case 
begs the question; why value can be destroyed for acquiring shareholders in CBM&A 
transactions? 
One explanation can be found in the motives for the M&A deal, which can cause either value 
creation or destruction. According to the agent theory put forward by Jensen (1986), corporate 
managers act in their own interests in order to increase their own utility and not necessarily in 
the interests of the shareholders. An example is the drive for managers to build empires or 
increase their own personal power, in which case, value is more often than not destroyed. 
Since many M&A deals during the second half of 20
th
 century did not create value, they were 
explained to be driven by the managers’ own interests and hubris (Roll, 1986). However, in 
the beginning of the 1990’s, it became apparent that synergy effects were the underlying 
motive behind M&A transactions (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993).  
There are three common theories which explain specifically CBM&A motives; the theory of 
comparative advantage, the imperfect markets theory and the product cycle theory (Madura, 
2006). The theory of comparative advantage states that countries, which have comparative 
advantages can benefit from each other if they trade these goods and services freely. The 
imperfect market theory proposes that resources are not freely transferrable across borders, 
which brings additional costs when transferring these. Markets are deemed to be imperfect 
and as a result, firms seek to bridge these market shortcomings by investing in foreign 
countries. Finally, the product cycle theory argues that a firm will initially try to satisfy the 
domestic market but as competition increases the firms will attempt to penetrate foreign 
markets to enhance its competitive position (Madura, 2006). 
In spite of the increased focus on the mentioned motives and the growing number of 
international transactions, from an acquiring company’s perspective, few produced the desired 
or expected gains (Hitt, Harrison and Ireland, 2001). Research carried out by KPMG report 
that by only 17% of cross-border acquisitions create value, while 57% destroys it (Shimizu et 
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al., 2004), something which must be explained by external factors. As mentioned in the 
background, there are traditional characteristics, applicable to M&A as well as CBM&A 
deals, which empirically have shown to affect shareholder wealth. In addition to these 
traditional characteristics, previous studies have shown macroeconomic and cultural factors to 
impact shareholder value.  
The fundamental idea behind CBM&A is that firms penetrate international markets in order to 
exploit the target’s specific resources and take advantage of the imperfections in the market 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Morck & Yeung, 1991; Wilson, 1980). The size of the target 
country can be used as a representation for identifying these opportunities. Graham, Martey & 
Yawson, (2008) indicate that the size of the target economy is very important and is 
recognised as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Another important economic measurement, 
which indicates the health of the economic condition in a country, is the rate of inflation. It 
indicates an adverse economic condition for several reasons, the value loss of capital, the 
encouragement of underinvestment, the distortion of resource allocation and the depression of 
the market (McKinsey, 2010). It is possible to achieve financial synergy through access to 
external funds at a lower cost of capital in the acquiring country and competitors in the target 
country then have to use more expensive ways of raising capital (Uddin & Boateng, 2010). 
Further financial gains can be achieved through the relative strength or weakness of the 
acquiring versus the target currency and can affect the premium paid in a CBM&A. However, 
the impact the exchange rate has on the acquirer is still unknown since expected future cash 
flows is a function of future exchange rates. Needless to say, according to Kiymaz (2004), an 
acquirer would benefit from at strong home currency at the time of the transaction and a 
weak, at the time of the repatriation of cash flows.  
In addition to the economic conditions in the target country mentioned previously, firms who 
engage CBM&A deals should also take political stability factors into consideration. Political 
stability entails numerous risks, such as internal and external conflicts, regime discontinuity 
and changes in the legal system (Meldrum, 2000; Brockmann, 2007). Cultural disparity 
signifies a larger cultural difference and according to Majidi (2007) cultural differences can 
be the underlying cause for miscommunications and conflicts. Subsequently, cultural 
differences can cause negative wealth effects for shareholders. Thus, as evident, there are 
numerous of variables to be taken into consideration in CBM&A transactions.  
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If corporate managers were aware of which factors affect value, regardless of motives, large 
CBM&A failures such Daimler Chrysler could have been avoided. Since the CBM&A field is 
still in its infancy compared to traditional M&A, the question remains; how does the market 
respond to a CBM&A announcement and which macroeconomic and cultural factors 
influence shareholder value for acquiring firms? 
 
1.3 Purpose 
Previous empirical studies describe how a set of macroeconomic and cultural factors 
influence shareholder value in CBM&A. Firms who are faced with the impending decision 
whether or not to expand internationally and engage in CBM&A, should be conscious of the 
fact that these macroeconomic and cultural factors might differ, depending on stage of 
development of the target country. To the best knowledge of the authors, limited research has 
been carried out of the differences between these factors depending on if the country is 
developed or developing. Therefore, this thesis intends to contribute to research by evaluating 
how the market responds to the announcement of a CBM&A transaction for acquiring 
shareholders and  examining the extent to which macroeconomic & cultural factors influence 
shareholder value creation as well as whether there are any differences between developed 
and developing countries. 
 
1.4 Demarcations 
The authors briefly describe the most essential demarcations that were carried out for the 
study. A complete thorough description can be found in the methodology chapter. 
In regards to the choice of methodology, the authors are aware of the fact that there are 
several methods to calculate wealth effects other than the one applied in this thesis. The use of 
the market model to investigate the existence of abnormal returns was a deliberate choice, 
since it is proven to yield more reliable results than other models (MacKinley, 1997). 
Subsequently, we considered it superfluous to incorporate further models. In addition, the 
study focuses on the short-term wealth effects, because long event studies are statistically less 
appropriate (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001). Finally, the authors assume that the theory 
regarding the efficient-market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) holds and as a result a short-term 
event study is more adequate to capture the reactions of the market in response to CBM&A 
announcements. 
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Only mergers and acquisitions will be considered in the thesis, other related entry modes, 
such as alliances, joint ventures and green field investments were left out. The reasoning is 
that CB&A is considered to be a faster way of exploiting the opportunities within foreign 
markets (Shimizu et al., 2004; Ma, Pagán & Chu, 2009; Seth, Song & Pettit, 2000) as a result; 
only M&A were taken into account for in the thesis.  
 
1.5 Audience 
This thesis will be of interest and is particularly relevant for academic as well as the corporate 
management. From an academic point of view, the thesis strives to engage students as well as 
researchers within the fields of corporate finance, economics and international business. From 
a corporate viewpoint, the thesis is of particular relevance to managers, analysts and investors 
involved in CBM&A strategy. 
 
1.6 Thesis outline 
In the first chapter, we have introduced background to the subject, problem discussion, the 
purpose of the paper and delimitations of this study as well as the audience for which the 
thesis is written. In the second chapter, literature review and an outline our hypotheses are 
presented. Chapter three presents the methodological approach to this study. The chapter 
includes research approach, event study, data collection regressions followed by the reliability 
and validity of the study. Chapter four contains empirical findings and analysis. Finally, the 
thesis ends with chapter five, which contains conclusion and suggestions for further research. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In the theoretical background chapter, the authors want to provide support to the problem 
discussion and purpose of the thesis, by thoroughly explaining the current state of theoretical 
and empirical research. A range of expressions are defined which lay the foundation for the 
thesis. Furthermore, the authors present relevant value creation characteristics in regards to 
CBM&A transactions. Finally, in connection to applicable theory each of the hypotheses is 
presented. 
 
2.1 Definition of M&A 
In academic literature there are several terms used interchangeably to describe different types 
of corporate mergers and acquisitions, including expressions such as takeover, transaction, 
consolidation and fusion (Wübben, 2007). Due to the lack of a suitable definition, above-
mentioned expressions are generally included under the broad term “mergers and 
acquisitions”. 
The main occurrence of an M&A is the transfer of ownership, management and control rights 
from the target company to the acquiring company (Wübben, 2007). There are two main 
mechanisms, by which these aforementioned rights can change; either by an acquisition of the 
target firm, or through a merger with another company. (Berk & DeMarzo. 2007). Mergers, as 
well as acquisitions, are similar when referring to changes in the economic control of an 
entity, but differ in the perpetuation of the legal existence of the target company (Wübben, 
2007). 
 
A merger refers to the strategy of combining two separate companies in order to create one, 
single corporation unit (Ogden, Jen & O’Connor, 2003) or to create a new legal entity 
(Wübben 2007). Consequently, the legal existence of at least one of firm is removed 
(Wübben, 2007) and frequently, the shares of one of the firms are extinguished, whereas the 
shares of the other remain outstanding. Typically, the shareholders of the incorporated firm 
are compensated through shares of the existing firm or cash, whilst the surviving firm 
purchases the assets and liabilities of the defunct firm (Ogden et al. 2003). In general, mergers 
are only carried out by an affirmative, majority vote of the shareholders of both firms, 
governed by explicit laws (Wübben, 2007). The definition of an acquisition also can be used 
to describe the abovementioned action. The surviving firm could be seen as the acquirer or the 
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bidder, whereas the deduct firm also can be named the acquired firm or the target (Ogden et 
al. 2003). However, in contrast to a merger, in an acquisition, the target firm is incorporated 
into the corporate group of the acquirer, leaving the legal existence of the target initially 
unaffected (Wübben, 2007). Since it has been proven difficult in previous literature to 
distinguish between mentioned transactions, both will henceforward be referred to as M&A. 
An overview can be found in table 1.   
 
Table 1 – Method for categorizing M&A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Types of M&A 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical foundation 
 
2.2.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been the basis for much of the theoretical 
development within the field of financial economics. The modern interpretation of the 
hypothesis can be traced to the 1960s from the authors Fama and Samuelson. 
In his hypothesis, Fama (1970) describes a market whose prices fully reflect the information 
available. He states that the market reacts immediately to any new information disclosed and 
the stock price is adjusted to a new equilibrium. The price is adjusted so quickly that investors 
do not have time to trade before anyone else i.e. investors cannot not receive any excess 
returns, thus receiving only a normal return on their investment. The price of a financial asset 
reflects all historical price information and it is not possible to predict future prices with the 
        
Type of business combination Strategic Direction Acquisition structure Status of the target 
- Acquisition - Horizontal - Asset deal - Private 
- Merger - Vertical - Share deal - Public 
  - Concentric     
  - Conglomerate     
        
Attitude Form of payment Financing Geographical focus 
- Friendly - Cash - Equity - Domestic 
- Hostile - Securities - Debt - Cross-border 
    - Hybrid   
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help of historical. Subsequently, when financial assets are traded, the price is an accurate 
reflection of the expected future returns (Fama, 1970). 
According to Fama (1970) there are three conditions that must be satisfied for the market to 
be efficient. Firstly, there are no transaction costs when trading assets. Secondly, all 
participants should have free access to all information. Thirdly, the participants should agree 
that the information available reflects the price of the asset. If all aforementioned criterions 
are fulfilled, the market is efficient. Nevertheless, this market does not exist due to the 
existence of transaction costs as well as information asymmetry. However, Fama (1970) states 
that this does not necessarily mean that the market is inefficient, but that there is a possibility 
that it could become inefficient (Fama, 1970). 
For example, when studying an M&A transaction, the main difficulty is to distinguish the 
unexpected effect of the event on the stock price. According to the efficient market 
hypothesis, the stock price should only react due to the unexpected part of the announcement 
as the expected part is already reflected in the stock price. As a conclusion, the efficient-
market hypothesis shows how efficient the market is in processing information and in 
explaining the pricing of stocks. In order to determine each market's degree of efficiency, 
Fama, divided the market efficiency into three different categories, which are briefly 
described below (Fama, 1970). 
 
Weak-form efficiency 
The weak-form efficiency is characterized by a market, which only reflects the stock price 
based on historical prices. It does not include any elements of future events. Thus, there are no 
trends or patterns in the price volatility, signifying that a technical analysis is not considered 
adding any value (Fama, 1970). 
 
Semi-strong-form efficiency 
The semi-strong efficient form means that historical prices, as well as available public 
information, are reflected in the stock price. Subsequently, the only participant who has the 
opportunity to beat the market is the investor who possesses inside information (Fama, 1970). 
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Strong-form efficiency 
In a market with strong-form efficiency, the stock prices are based on all available 
information, including insider information. All participants receive the same information at 
the same time and thus there are no ways to beat the market in the long term (Fama, 1970). 
Malkiel (2003) describes how it is not possible to create any excess returns as it not possible 
to affect the stock prices. He explains the concept as a study of monkeys throwing dart on a 
stock map and surpassing the result of many investors. He states, as Fama, that the market is 
efficient. Over the years, the theory of efficient markets has been questioned. Malkiel has 
recently been partly changed his view of the theory by adding the human factor. This is only 
applicable in the short term, when bad investments and misjudgements are made by investors, 
but in the long term the market will recover to be efficient (Malkiel, 2003). In short, the 
efficient-market hypothesis thus is based on rational investors immediately reacting on the 
announcement of an M&A transaction, which means that an effect on the stock price should 
occur immediately. Nevertheless, some time after the announcement there should not be any 
effects on the stock profit (Rosen, 2006). According to the efficient-market hypothesis, the 
stock price for a company that carries out an M&A, should only be affected by this event, as 
all other information available about the firm is considered to be accessible for anyone and 
has already been discounted by the market. This is a prerequisite for conclusions to be drawn 
based on the results of this thesis. In addition, only the unexpected part of the transaction 
should affect the stock price. Thus, any abnormal returns can be explained by investors' 
expectations either outperform the market or the opposite. 
 
2.2.2 Signalling theory 
The signalling theory argues that markets are not fully efficient. The management has access 
to better information than the remaining shareholders and may act from it. The signals that 
management sends out can illustrate the future direction of the firm and which results the 
company faces. The management signals to demonstrate what it is doing to maximize the 
value of the firm (Van Horne & Wachowicz, 2005). The market is in need of information and 
reacts not only on what the management communicates but also on how it performs. 
For example, the market reacts on dividends; if increasing the dividend of the firm, investors 
generally react positively. When the management shows that it believes in a as a positive 
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future and that it goes from words to action, the signalling theory can explain the market's 
positive reaction (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2006). 
Through its actions, the management sends out signals to the market and M&A transactions 
constitute signals that influence expectations of the investors. If there is a strong confidence in 
the management and the information about the transaction is explicit, it should be reflected in 
the reaction of the investors. If the signals are interpreted by the market as the management 
has an optimistic belief in the future, this should cause the stock price rise. This is also true 
for the reverse, when there is pessimistic belief in the future the opposite reaction is expected. 
 
2.3 Theoretical background for M&A 
2.3.1 Motives for M&A 
Apart from the aforementioned factors, in previous studies, the existence of M&A has been 
explained by the underlying motives for such transactions. Three main categories of motives 
from earlier studies are; the agent problem, the hubris hypothesis and synergy effects 
(Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Haleblian, Devers & McNamara, 2009). 
 
Agent problem 
Through studies, it has been found that in some cases, M&A are completely motivated by 
agent problem, meaning that they are motivated by the acquiring company’s management 
team’s self interests. They are carried out with the expectation to maximize the personal 
utility, but not necessarily the wealth of the shareholders and are subsequently often value-
destroying (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). Different ways for the managers to practise their 
self-interests have been identified and two commonly known examples are that the 
management buys other companies in order to expand the size of its own firm (Jensen, 1986) 
and to lessen the risk by diversifying (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Another example is that 
managers carry out M&A within their own business areas where they have an edge in 
competence. In that way, the managers reinforce their position within the new, merged firm. It 
has been found that an M&A driven by such factors is carried out even though they are value-
destroying for the shareholders of the acquiring firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). When an 
M&A transaction yields a sufficient personal profit, the management is willing to sacrifice the 
market value of the firm in order to engage in an M&A. Subsequently, the managers will pay 
a premium containing such personal profits (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). All 
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aforementioned actions lead to so-called agent costs, reducing the value of the consolidated 
company. In that way, value is destroyed for the shareholders of the acquiring firms when 
managers engage in M&A based on agent motives (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). 
 
 
Hubris hypothesis 
Roll (1986) contributed to the behavioural corporate finance literature by introducing the 
hubris hypothesis as a motive for engaging in M&As. The hubris hypothesis is based on a 
market without synergy effects where M&A transactions are motivated by hubris and bad 
judgements by the managers (Roll, 1986). Nevertheless, since it has been proven empirically 
that M&A create value, the hubris hypothesis does not completely hold. However, Roll 
(1986) states in despite the existence of synergy effects, managers often make bad 
judgements, which leads to acquisitions. This fact is often expressed as the decision makers 
being hubristic, overestimating their own ability to realize synergies, which leads to incorrect 
estimations (Roll, 1986). This in turn, makes the managers estimate the target firm to at a 
higher value than the present market value and the acquiring company ends up paying a 
surplus premium (Hodgkinson & Partington, 2008). The outcome is that value is created for 
the shareholders of the target firm, whereas value is destroyed for the shareholders of the 
acquiring firm (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). 
The management of the bidding firm overvalues the target because they overestimate their 
capacity of value-creation upon gaining control of the target’s assets (Ogden et al. 2003). The 
fundamental prediction of the hypothesis is that at the day of the announcement, the general 
change in market value should be at least zero, since M&A is costly. (Ogden et al. 2003) This 
is because the market, apart from the management of the bidder, realizes that there are no 
synergy gains (Ogden et al. 2003). Roll further tried to show this valuation effect on 
acquisitions and takeover announcements to prove his point. The evidence shows that the 
shareholders of the target firm realize significant positive abnormal returns, whereas past 
research indicates that the effect on bidder’s shareholders is insignificant (Ogden et al. 2003). 
Hence, Roll has shown that value is created in an acquisition or takeover but shareholders of 
the target firm receive all of the added value (Ogden et al. 2003). 
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Synergy hypothesis 
The synergy hypothesis suggests that companies engage in M&A, since there are synergy 
potentials, the value of the consolidated firm is higher than the value of each company alone 
(Seth et al., 2000). Another definition of synergy is a source of value-creating efficiency 
arising from combining the assets, operations and financial structures of two companies in a 
merger (Ogden et al. 2003). Synergy effects are normally divided into two groups; operational 
and financial (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). All in all, operating synergy refers to either horizontal 
or vertical mergers whereas financial synergy includes a possibility of lowered cost of capital 
due to the incorporation of one or more companies (Gaughan, 2007). Synergies can also be 
explained as the present value of the net-increase of the cash flows generated by a 
consolidation of two companies that could not have been accomplished by any of the 
companies alone (Ficery, Herd & Pursche, 2007). The abovementioned can also be seen 
mathematically with the following equation:  
 

Value (Consolidated) Value (Acquiror) Value (Target)  Synergy  
 
Following the equation above, the maximal purchase price that the acquirer is willing to pay 
is; Value (Target) + Synergy (Davidson, 1985). Financial synergy can be achieved by lowered 
cost of capital, higher debt-to-equity ratio, lowered corporate tax rate (Jensen & Ruback, 
1983), direct risk reduction and liquidity enhancement (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). The 
operational synergy creates value by increasing the free cash flow in two ways; revenue 
enhancement and cost reductions (Ogden et al. 2003). 
Operating synergy is achieved if the merger creates enhancements in any business function 
such as management, labour costs, production or distribution, resource acquisition and 
allocation and market power (Ogden et al. 2003). It can be divided into two groups; revenue 
enhancement and cost reductions (Sirower & Sahni, 2006; Chatterjee, 2007; Gaughan, 2007; 
Arnold, 2008). 
There are various sources of revenue enhancement such as sharing of market opportunities 
through a cross-market of each merger partner’s products, or the loan of the merger’s well-
reputed brand name to an upcoming product line of a merger partner. Revenue-enhancing 
synergy might also be accomplished from the merger of one company with a strong 
distribution network and a company with products of great potential but with difficulties 
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introducing them to the market (Gaughan, 2007). To conclude, revenue enhancements relate 
to the possibility of expanding and penetrating new markets as well as finding new consumers 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). Nevertheless, revenue-enhancing synergies are sometimes difficult 
to achieve and hard to quantify, which is why cost reductions is cited as the most important 
source of operating synergy (Gaughan, 2007). 
Synergy effects derived from revenue enhancement increase the growth rate for the merged 
firm, as opposed to two separate companies. Revenue enhancement can arise from cross-
selling, cross-marketing, increased competitiveness and market power. Cross-selling and 
cross-marketing refer to companies benefitting each other’s sales channels, customer basis, 
access to market and brand name to increase the consolidated sales compared to the sales of 
each company respectively (Sirower & Sahni, 2006; Gaughan, 2007). Nevertheless, it can 
easily be confused with marketing and shared sales channels where the purpose instead is to 
split aforementioned functions over additional product categories in order to reduce costs 
(Rappaport, 1986). Seth et al. (2000), state that in CBM&A, growth is achieved as a result of 
buying based on general know-how. Previous research has tried to identify how firms that 
have engaged in horizontal acquisitions have managed to increase their market power, for 
example by increasing their prices to customers (Kim & Singal, 1993; Sapienza, 2002). 
Operating synergies related to cost reductions are more frequent and easier accomplished, 
since in practice, it normally leads to dismissal of employees and elimination of unnecessary 
resources (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). One important source is economies of scale, i.e. 
decreased per-unit costs due to the increase in size or scale of the production (Gaughan, 
2007). This is because the fixed costs of the firm’s operating facilities are spread out over 
higher levels of output. Furthermore, companies can benefit from economies of scale by 
reducing manufacturing costs due to the possibility of renegotiating supplier contacts when 
acting as a larger corporation (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). Other sources of cost reduction worth 
mentioning are increased specialization of labour management and more efficient use of 
facilities (Gaughan, 2007). Another term that is closely related is economies of scope, which 
is the capacity of a firm to use some inputs to provide a broader range of products and 
services (Gaughan, 2007). Economies of scope can create cost reductions deriving from 
savings due to a combination of the marketing and the distribution of diverse sorts of related 
products (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). 
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Cost reductions are commonly referred to as economies of scale and economies of scope. The 
former, means that the cost per produced output (variable costs) for the merged firm are 
reduced compared to each company alone. Economies of scope refer to the average costs for 
all the products of the merged firm, since all the different product functions use the same 
resources (Gaughan, 2007). Synergy effects derived from cost reductions are often 
accomplished from taking advantage from already existing assets in a more efficient way, 
splitting the fixed cost, increase the specialization and subsequently and increase the 
efficiency of the firm (Gaughan, 2007). 
Financial synergy is achieved in a merger if the extent of the financial configuration of the 
merged firm leads to a higher market value than the sum of the market values of the firms 
separately (Ogden et al. 2003). Nevertheless, financial is not achievable in an ideal capital 
market, as has been proven by Modigliani & Miller (1958) through the irrelevance of an 
individual company’s capital structure (Ogden et al. 2003). Simply incorporating two 
companies will not create value even though the cash flow volatility of the merged firm will 
be smaller than a value-weighted average of the cash flow volatilities of the individual firms, 
this as a result of the diversification effect (Ogden et al. 2003). Financial synergy can also 
include the fact that merged firms might realize a higher optimal debt ratio due to the 
traditional trade-off theory of optimal capital structure. Consequently from the merger, the 
two firms can reduce its probability of bankruptcy as long as their cash flows are not perfectly 
correlated. In addition, the greater debt capacity brings an increase in tax benefits from the tax 
shield from interest deductibility and hence, an increase in total market value (Ogden et al. 
2003). 
 
Diversification 
According to the respondents of a survey carried out by Mukherjee & Kiymaz (2004), another 
important motive is diversification. Benefits from diversification consist of three different 
kinds; direct risk reduction, lower cost of debt or increased debt capacity and liquidity 
enhancement (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). 
A frequently used argument to justify an M&A, is that alike a large portfolio, larger firms 
hold less idiosyncratic risk (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). However, investors can accomplish the 
benefits of diversification on their own by hedging their investments and in addition, there are 
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a lot of costs associated with merging and running a diversified firm (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2007). 
Ceteris paribus, larger, diversified firms are less exposed to the risk of bankruptcy given the 
same degree of leverage (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). Therefore, such firms can increase their 
debt-to-equity-ratio and benefit from tax shield effects without fearing significant cost of 
financial distress. Hence, increased tax benefits and decreased bankruptcy-related costs from 
leverage are clear advantages of diversifying through mergers (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). 
Shareholders of private firms are often not hedged, since they have unbalanced share of their 
wealth invested in that specific firm. As a result, when an acquirer buys the private target, it 
offers the target’s owners a way to decrease their exposure to risk by reinvesting their shares 
in a diversified portfolio. This is often a vital factor to why shareholders accept the takeover 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Factors influencing shareholder value in M&A 
In addition to various motives when engaging in M&A transactions, there are certain factors 
that can impact an M&A, as a source of wealth creation. Expressed differently, these are the 
reasons considered to not be the underlying factors, when engaging in M&A but still affect 
the created value. Based on theories within the field of value creation, different variables have 
been examined to investigate their impact on the value creation at an M&A transaction. Hitt, 
King, Krishnan, Makri, Schijven, Shimizu and Zhu (2009) have performed a summarized 
study, which shows the most common variables from 89 articles. The most frequent are 
whether the transaction is focused or diversified (58 percent), the relative size of the firms (52 
percent), the previous experience of M&A transaction for the acquiring firm (28 percent) and 
the method of payment (18 percent). These variables will be presented briefly.  
 
Method of payment 
There are various ways to finance an M&A transaction. In general, the deals include cash, 
equities or a combination of both. Previous literature demonstrates the impact of the method 
of payment on M&A transactions. Loughran and Vihj (1997) concluded that complete stock 
mergers yield significant negative excess returns of 25 percent, whereas transactions paid in 
full with cash generated positive excess returns of 61.8 percent. The authors state that, for 
complete stock transactions, the stock of the acquiring firm can be overvalued. Information 
 
 
18 
 
asymmetry is a complication within M&A and firms can use equity as a method of payment 
to mitigate this problem, especially when the target is likely to have proprietary information 
of its value. Since M&A transactions are difficult to estimate, it can be thought that bidders 
desire equity as method of payment. Equity is argued to have contingent-pricing 
characteristics and thus could surpass cash (Hansen, 1987). Nevertheless, targets in emerging 
countries are often hesitant to accept foreign equity, forcing acquirers to finance with cash 
(Chari, Parker Ouinmet & Tesar, 2004). Eckbo & Thorburn (1990) argue that information 
asymmetry is two-sided, and thus deals with a combination of cash and equity would be 
optimal and surpass either complete share or cash transactions.  
Information asymmetry is often mentioned as an explanation to use equity as a method of 
payment to mitigate the problem, especially when the target is considered to have proprietary 
information of its value. Since CBM&A deals are complex to evaluate, it could be assumed 
that acquirers prefer equity as method of payment. The equity is considered to have 
contingent-pricing characteristics and thus could surpass cash transactions (Hansen, 1987). 
Nevertheless, targets in emerging countries are often unwilling to accept foreign equity, 
which oblige acquirers to use cash (Chari et al., 2004). On the contrary, Eckbo & Thorburn 
(1990) stated that information asymmetry is two- sided, and thus deals with a joint finance 
method should represent equilibrium and surpass either complete share or cash deals as a 
method of payment. 
 
Market to book 
Market to book (MTB) is often used as a proxy for pre-bid performance of the acquiring firm. 
A high value indicates high expectations on future performance and is thus considered 
positive (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). Nevertheless, empirical research proves the opposite. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that acquirers with a lower MTB value create significantly 
higher value than high MTB acquirers. This is accordance with the study of Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003). The hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) is often mentioned to be the reason. When 
managers have previously experienced success, the probability of becoming overconfident is 
imminent. Previous success might also increase the expectations of the markets on future 
performance. Furthermore, high MTB acquirers are considered to be overvalued due to their 
previous successes which might impede the evaluation of their deals whereas low MTB 
acquirers, due to their previous poor performance, are forced to estimate their deals more 
sincerely (Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003). 
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Acquirer experience 
Previous studies have found that the probability of an acquisition to be impacted by the 
acquirer CBM&A experience of similar transactions (Amburgey & Miner, 1992). 
Nevertheless, the evidence is diverse, (Haleblian et al., 2009). Zollo and Singh (2004) 
discovered that the performance of the acquiring companies was not affected by its previous 
experience solely, but positively affected from the process of learning the lessons from past 
CBM&A transactions. Another result has been proposed by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), 
who found that relatively inexperienced acquirers do not have the capacity to distinguish the 
specific characteristics of the acquisition, and subsequently inappropriately generalize 
experience from previous transactions to new deals. More experienced acquiring firms evade 
this mistake, as they are capable of identifying the different characteristics of the each 
acquisition. Thus the superior acquirers, are the ones with either extensive or no experience at 
all. Furthermore, Beckman and Haunschild (2002) found that the decision of whether to carry 
out the transaction or not, was influenced by their level of experience due to the fact that 
acquirers with previous experience has superior information and consequently pays a lower 
premium. However, Doukas and Travlos (1988) provide contradicting results and reason that 
CBM&A deals do not create any value if the acquirer is already operating within the target 
nation. Therefore, it is unclear whether experience affects value or not. 
 
Size of the deal 
The size of the acquiring firm might influence the performance of CBM&A deals positively 
as well as negatively. Firstly, larger firms might hold the financial resources and knowledge 
to execute the pre-bid process, including due-diligence and negotiation, and the 
implementation of post-bid procedures more efficiently. Thus they might have better potential 
to create value for shareholders. Larger firms also have higher likelihood of benefitting from 
economies of scale and scope (Graham et al, 2008). Bhagat, Malhotra & Zhu (2011) found a 
positive relationship between relative size measured as transaction value divided by the 
acquirer’s market capitalization, and the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a 
three day event window surrounding the announcement of the transaction. This is in line with 
Graham et al, (2008) who concluded that larger firms are more likely to acquire firms in 
emerging markets. Conversely, Jensen (1986) argues that larger firms have a tendency to have 
a weaker ownership control and thus have more severe agent problem. These arguments are 
further supported by Moeller et al. (2004) who found a negative relationship between size and 
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the acquirers’ CAR. This was thought to be due to managerial hubris since larger firms 
offered larger premiums. 
 
2.3.3 Empirical evidence on motives for M&A 
Because of the complexity when determining which is the underlying motive to an M&A, 
research and several studies have tried to distinguish which motives drive M&A. Berkovitch 
& Narayanan (1993) summarize previous research and reason that agent problems and hubris 
should be the main motives for engaging in M&A activity during the 1980s, since M&A on 
average was value-destroying. The reasoning is in accordance with Malatesta (1983) 
conclusion that the agent problem is the largest motive. Berkovitch & Narayanan are in their 
study examining underlying motives by investigating which motives were value-creating in 
relation to how much value was created by M&A between 1963 and 1988. Their outcome was 
that synergy effects is the primary motive for an M&A (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). In a 
similar study, Kiymaz & Baker (2008) also conclude that synergy is the main factor to M&A 
within their sample selection of the 100 largest M&A transactions every year between 1992-
2000.  
Research and literature indicate that companies involved in M&A have learned from previous 
experience. The hubris hypothesis and the agent problem are not as commonly referred to, 
mainly because M&A has proven to create value, much of which however, is attributed to the 
shareholders of the target company. Subsequently, the most significant underlying motive for 
M&A of recent studies has been synergy effects. 
 
2.3.4 Empirical evidence on M&A value effects 
Previous research indicates that M&A in general create value but the majority accrues the 
shareholders of the target company. The greater part of the empirical studies performed within 
the field, indicates that more than a third of the M&A carried out is value-destroying for the 
acquiring firm (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, 2005). The study of 1415 M&A between 1997 
and 2009 executed by McKinsey, gives evidence to an average increase of market value of 4 
percent as a result of an M&A. When examining the outcome more closely, it became evident 
that the acquiring firm experience an average market value decrease of -5.8 percent, whereas 
the same value for the target firm was +9.8 percent (Rehm & Sivertsen, 2010). The reactions 
of the capital market have also been scrutinized by Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz (2004), 
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who found that value, is destroyed for shareholders of the acquiring firm and that a value 
weighted average M&A leads to a drop of the stock price of the acquiring firm of -1-3  
percent. Jensen & Ruback (1983), state that M&A does create value, but only for the 
shareholders of the target firm. 
Bruner (2004) studied 14 informal and 100 scholar studies within the M&A field between 
1971 and 2001 and also concludes that M&A creates value, if measuring the consolidated 
value creation. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of all companies in the study indicates 
positive results for the shareholders of the target company, whereas the results for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm vary. According to aforementioned study, 24 out of 44 
studies indicate a positive CAR for the acquiring firm and the remaining 20 show a negative 
CAR. The study of Bruner (2004) also illustrates that CAR has a tendency of declining over 
time. Subsequently, Bruner (2004) concludes that abnormal returns (AR) for the shareholders 
of the acquiring firm are equal to null over the wide spectrum of studies. Tuch & O’Sullivan 
(2007) agree with Bruner and state that independent of the time frame chosen for measuring 
the abnormal returns, few studies indicate a positive AR for the shareholders of the acquiring 
firm. Andrade et al. (2001) examine 4256 completed M&A between 1973 and 1998 and 
conclude that the total abnormal returns for both parties of the transaction were +1.8 percent, 
indicating, as in the study of Bruner (2004), that M&A in general creates value. Nevertheless, 
it is evident from the study that the value created only accrues the shareholders of the target 
firm. 
To sum up, according to empirical studies M&A is value creating, but the value is only be 
accrued the shareholders of the target firm. The most significant reason for this is that the 
premium paid by the acquiring firm is approximately equal to the value created in an M&A 
transaction, why the shareholders of the target firm capture the value (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2007). 
 
2.4 Theoretical background for cross-border M&A 
2.4.1 CBM&A 
Firms operating in industries with intense competition often face the difficulty in maintaining 
high organic growth, which is why cross-border M&A (CBM&A) offers an option to ensure 
that a firm does not lose market shares to faster growing rivals. Subsequently, CBM&A is a 
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strategy for aforementioned firms to gain market shares (Gaughan, 2007). In general, 
CBM&A transactions yield higher synergy effects than domestic M&A deals due to the 
possible diversification synergies from the target company. Such effects are referred to as 
intangible assets (brand names), R&D expenditure and knowledge of the employees (Conn, 
Cosh, Guest & Hughes, 2003).  
 
2.4.2 Motives for CBM&A 
All the motives are for M&A are also true for CBM&A, but this section emphasizes motives 
that are explicit for the geographical diversified deals. According to Madura (2006), there are 
three main theories for why firms expand abroad; the theory of comparative advantage, the 
imperfect market theory and the product cycle theory.  
The theory of comparative advantage refers to the fact that a firm has an advantage relative 
others when it is able to manufacture the same products and services at a lower cost. The 
theory states that two firms can benefit from specializing their production in the service or 
goods where it has a principal advantage. The imperfect market theory states that available 
resources vary between firms. Hence, transferring products across firms is costly due to 
restrictions. As a result, since the markets are imperfect, firms have an incentive to engage in 
international opportunities, CBM&A. Companies manufacture products and services to fulfil 
the home market, however, the theory of the product cycle suggests that as the home market 
develops, competition will intensify. As this happens, the firm will turn to new, foreign 
markets (Madura, 2006).  
In addition to aforementioned theories, the internationalization theory elaborated by Rugman 
(1979) and Caves (1990), states that internationalization will be valuable for a firm when it 
can benefit from intangible assets, enhanced knowledge, marketing and managerial capacity. 
These assets have different defects, such as limited information, monopoly and immobility. 
They are related to public goods and their value is set in proportion to the scale of the markets 
of the firm. The assets are based on patent protected information and for various reasons it is 
complex to exchange them. Nevertheless, by expanding to new, foreign markets for these 
assets, companies can avoid such transaction complications and consequently increase the 
value of the particular asset (Caves, 1990).  
As with domestic M&A transactions, previous research has proven that companies wish to 
accomplish economies of scale and scope through CBM&A (Buckley & Ghauri, 2002). An 
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additional motive for firms to engage in CBM&A is to expand business relationship with 
clients in other countries (Weston, Mitchell, Mark & Mulherin, 2004). Furthermore, some 
studies propose purchasing strategic assets such as marketing skills, product differentiation, 
proprietary technology and managerial knowledge as a major factor for performing CBM&A 
transactions (Wang & Boateng, 2007). Aforementioned assets are important resources 
improving the competitive advantages of the company (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). 
Empirically it has been shown that new environments will make firms change their 
organization structure and are thus forced to adapt new knowledge (Crossan, Lane & White, 
1999). 
As previously stated, an essential motive for CBM&A is to penetrate new, foreign markets. 
Numerous studies have been performed on CBM&A regarding the potential of firm engaging 
in CBM&A as a method to enter foreign markets (Harzing, 2002; Luo & Tung, 2007). Even 
though there are several ways to enter a new market, a successful acquisition has proven to be 
the quickest way (Wang & Boateng, 2007). In comparison with joint ventures and strategic 
alliances, an acquisition will allow the acquiring firm more effective control of the operations. 
(Raff, Ryan & Staehler, 2009). Furthermore, an acquisition is a less time and money 
consuming approach to take advantage of a mature operation (Gilroy & Lukas, 2006). 
For firms, which wish to develop in a dynamic competition, learning is often considered to be 
one of the strategic means (Collins, Holcomb, Certo, Hitt & Lester, 2009). Companies would 
face complications that vary compared to their regular strategic and organizational 
circumstance, which would give the acquiring firms possibilities to learn through CBM&A. 
The learning process begins from the pre-CBM&A valuation and negotiation and continues 
throughout the entire CBM&A process. In addition, the ability will be improved and 
continued during the learning process (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
 
2.4.3 Factors influencing shareholder value in CBM&A 
Factors influencing M&A also affect CBM&A transactions but this section emphasizes 
variables that are specific to CBM&A deals. Previous studies such as di Giovanni (2005), 
Globerman and Shapiro (2005), Aminian and Campart (2005), Kamaly (2007) and Uddin & 
Boateng, (2010) examine macroeconomic factors affecting shareholder wealth and based on 
previous literature, the variables included in this thesis are briefly described in the coming 
sections. 
 
 
24 
 
Economic size 
The fundamental motive behind CBM&A transactions is the possibility to penetrate new 
markets to take advantage of the targets’ specific resources and exploit the imperfection in the 
market (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Morck & Yeung, 1992; Wilson, 1980). This further 
generates  arbitrage institutional restrictions such tax codes, antitrust provisions and financial 
limitations, for the involved firms  (Doukas & Travlos, 1988); while at the same time 
increasing the operational flexibility of the companies by providing them with the possibility 
to benefit from different market conditions (Kogut, 1983). One way to measure these 
opportunities is through the size of the target country. A large economic market can offer 
advantageous investment opportunities for the acquiring firms, which have the resources to 
exploit them. CBM&A transactions in countries with a large economic size, a good economic 
condition and good economic forecast are probable to generate wealth effects for 
shareholders.  Moosa (2002) proposes that the volume of FDI inflows into a country is 
influenced by its market size. In other words, the larger the market size of the country in terms 
of national GDP, the larger the inflow of FDI to that nation. The explanation to this is that 
large markets can generate economies of scale for the involved firms (Stoian & Filippaios, 
2008). Relevant research such as Anand and Kogut (1997) and Globerman and Shapiro 
(1999) further support the opinion that higher GDP in the country tend to attract more 
acquisition FDI, because of the possibility of higher demand and potentially higher profits in 
the economy.  
 
GDP 
High investments involve high risks and are only acceptable in large markets.  Therefore, it is 
expected that acquisitions in countries with a larger economic size affects shareholder wealth 
positively.  
Hypothesis 1: GDP is expected to influence the shareholder value of the acquiring firm. 
 
GDP per capita  
 
It is important to complement the size of the economy with the economic condition of a 
country, as economic size alone, might be a result of a large population alone and therefor still 
has a relatively low purchasing power. According to Montero (2008), GDP is an indicator of a 
growing market that can support emerging economies of scale.  The abovementioned 
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reasoning also holds for GDP per capita and subsequently GDP per capita is expected to 
positively affect shareholder wealth. 
Hypothesis 2: GDP per capita is expected to influence the shareholder value of the acquiring 
firm. 
 
GDP growth 
In addition to the current situation of a nation, its future forecast is essential as well and 
sustained growth provides the promise of expanding opportunities (Montero, 2008).   Firms 
often face the difficulty to maintain a high, organic growth why expanding in countries with 
higher growth is a solution (Gaughan, 2007). With a developing economy, the purchasing 
power rises, and hence creates more demand for products. Subsequently, GDP growth is 
expected to positively affect shareholder wealth.  
Hypothesis 3: GDP growth is expected to influence the shareholder value of the acquiring 
firm. 
 
Interest rate 
There are other important economic measurements, which indicate the health of the economic 
condition in a country. In any CBM&A deal, an important component is the financing of the 
transaction. Pablo (2009) and Forssbaeck & Oxelheim (2008) claim that the capacity and 
propensity for a firm to carry out CBM&A transactions investment can be explained by the 
cost of capital and access to finance. For example, accessibility to lower cost of external funds 
yields a financial synergy and thus increases the probability of deals. Previous research states 
that the correlation between CBM&A activity and interest rates shows that lower interest rates 
reduces the cost of financing in the acquirer country because of the wealth of capital and thus 
encourages profitability of international expansion (Tolentino, 2010). Yang, Groenewold, & 
Tcha (2000) and Jeon and Rhee (2008) found further evidence by concluding the role of 
interest rates in attracting CBM&A to be important.  Kish & Vasconcellos (1993) further 
propose that higher interest rate in the country discourages inflow of CBM&As. It is expected 
that the larger the difference in interest rate between target and acquirer country, the larger the 
positive wealth effects for shareholders for two reasons. Firstly, as mentioned, there is a 
possibility to gain financial synergy through access to external funds at a lower cost of capital 
in the acquirer country and secondly, competitors in the target country have to use more 
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expensive ways of raising capital (Uddin & Boateng, 2010).   
Hypothesis 4: Differences in interest rates between acquirer and target are expected to 
influence the shareholder value of the acquiring firm. 
 
Inflation 
Another important economic measurement, which indicates the health of the economic 
condition in a country, is the rate of inflation. Black (2000), states that a lower rate of 
inflation was an important factor for the growth of CBM&A transactions in the 1990s. High 
rates of inflation signify a bad economic condition as inflation causes devaluation of capital 
whereas lower rates lead to lower prices in target and lower cost of debt, subsequently 
encouraging higher volumes of CBM&A transactions. On the contrary, higher inflation in the 
acquiring country will make the domestic targets more expensive, motivating potential 
acquirers to seek opportunities where the inflation rate is low (Uddin & Boateng, 2010). Apart 
from value loss of capital, inflation further causes encouragement of underinvestment, 
distortion of resource allocation and depression of the market. Therefore, it is expected that 
inflation in the target country is negatively correlated with shareholder wealth. 
Hypothesis 5: Inflation is expected to influence the shareholder value of the acquiring firm. 
 
Exchange rate 
The relative strength or weakness of the acquiring versus the target currency can affect the 
premiums paid in an M&A. It can further affect the cost of the target, how the deal is financed 
and the value of the repatriated returns to the bidder. Several studies, such as Harris & 
Ravenscraft (1991) and Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000), claim that when the acquiring 
currency is strong relative the target currency, the target shareholders receive greater returns. 
This is since a stronger foreign currency allows the acquirer to pay a higher premium for the 
target. The impact the exchange rate has on the acquirer is still unknown since expected future 
cash flows is a function of future exchange rates. Overall, acquirers would benefit from a 
strong home currency at the time of the transaction and a weak home currency at the time of 
the repatriation of dividends and cash flows (Kiymaz, 2004).  
Hypothesis 6: Differences between acquiring and target currency at the time of the 
transaction is expected to influence the shareholder value of the acquiring firm. 
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Political stability 
In addition to the economic conditions in the target country mentioned previously, firms who 
engage in CBM&A deals also take political stability factors into consideration. Political 
stability entails numerous risks, such as internal and external conflicts, regime discontinuity 
and changes in the legal system (Meldrum, 2000; Brockmann, 2007). A CBM&A deal 
involves huge amounts of invested capital and especially when expanding in developing 
countries, regime changes and variations in the regulatory environment might jeopardize the 
invested capital (Aguiar & Gopiath, 2007). It is expected that there is a positive correlation 
between political stability and wealth effects for shareholders.  
Hypothesis 7: Political stability is expected to influence the shareholder value of the 
acquiring firm. 
 
Culture 
Another non-economically related factor is the culture, taking into account the four cultural 
dimensions; power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance (Soares, 
Fehrangmehr & Shoham, 2007). Power distance deals with the fact that all people of a society 
are not equal, and the dimension expresses the attitude of the culture towards these inequities. 
Power distance can in other words, be defined as the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organisations within a nation expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally”.  The fundamental idea of the individual dimension is whether people’s 
self-image is defined as “I” or “We”. In individualist societies, people are only looking after 
themselves and their own family whereas in a collectivist society people belong to groups, 
looking after these people in exchange for loyalty. A high masculinity dimension score 
specifies that a society is driven by competition, achievement and success, an attitude 
commencing in school. A low score indicates a feminine society where the dominant values 
are caring for others and quality of life and that standing out from the crowd is not admirable. 
Finally, uncertainty avoidance refers to the way a society deals with unknown situations; 
should one try to control it or just let it happen? This uncertainty causes anxiety and different 
cultures deal with this anxiety differently (Soares et al., 2007). According to Majidi (2007), 
higher disparity from the mentioned dimensions can be the underlying cause for 
miscommunications and conflicts that can cause negative wealth effects for shareholders.  
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Hypothesis 8: Cultural differences are expected to influence the shareholder value of the 
acquiring firm. 
 
Language 
Language is the first of the CBM&A control variables in the thesis and refers to a common 
spoken language in both acquiring and target countries. According to Kiymaz (2004), a 
common spoken language, results in lower transactions costs, since it is believed that 
companies are able to communicate and understand each other efficiently. Moreover, a 
common language might signify a smaller cultural disparity why a transaction between two 
countries with a common language is supposed to be positively related to acquiring 
shareholder wealth (Kiymaz, 2004).  
 
Geographical diversification 
Geographic Location refers to the effects of geographical diversification. Regions vary in 
global integration and consequently have different potential in terms of diversification. 
Previous research has proven that geographically diversified firms increase the risk-return 
trade-off. Moreover, CBM&A transactions might explain differences in wealth effects due to 
the various levels of economic development, economic integration and diversification 
potential (Kiymaz, 2004). A common legal environment can influence shareholder value 
positively since firms can benefit from operating in a common legal environment but might 
also influence firms from countries outside of the legal entity negatively, since transaction 
costs increase. Doukas & Travlos (1988) prove that the acquirer can benefit from entering a 
new market for the first time since valuable knowledge is accessed which is in line with the 
study of Shimizu et al. (2004), which states that geographical diversification is value-
enhancing as it increases the growth opportunities.  
 
Industrial diversification 
This refers to the potential industrial diversification between target and acquiring firms. Firms 
differ in their structure and therefore have different international diversification potential 
(Kiymaz, 2004). Doukas & Travlos (1988) conclude that wealth effects are greater when 
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diversifying across industries.  It is expected that firms in different industries will create 
diversification gains and therefore positively affect shareholder wealth.  
 
2.4.4 Empirical evidence on motives for CBM&A 
Madura (2006) summarizes relevant theories to why firms engage in CBM&A transactions. 
He states that the theory of comparative advantages, the imperfect market theory and the 
product cycle theory are major motives for CBM&A deals. Morck & Yeung (1991) confirms 
the influence of the internationalization theory, that cross-border deals are expected to benefit 
firms in form of important intangible assets such as patents, brand and goodwill. They state 
that firms engaging in CBM&A transactions are firms that “posses useful intangible asset to 
the value of which is proportional to the firm’s degree of multinationality”. 
Internationalization can further be argued to be rivalry between oligopolistic firms to head off 
opportunities and maturing niches.  Harris & Ravenscraft (1991) agree and reason that 
CBM&A transactions are more frequent within R&D intensive branches than domestic M&A 
deals.  
A further motive stated by Gaughan (2007) is that firms facing the difficulty to maintain a 
high, organic growth can gain market shares from competitors through engaging in CBM&A 
strategy. In general, CBM&A transactions yield higher synergy effects than domestic M&A 
deals due to the possible diversification synergies from the target company. Such effects are 
referred to as intangible assets (brand names), R&D expenditure and knowledge of the 
employees (Conn et al., 2003). Finally, firms might want to follow their clients abroad to 
maintain and further develop the business relationship (Weston et al., 2004).   
Previous literature shows that the three theories summed together by Madura (2006) are 
together with the internationalization theory (Morck & Yeung, 1991) that multinational 
companies can take advantage of the market imperfections for their intangible assets abroad. 
Similar to general M&A deals, synergy effects seem to be an important motive also for cross-
border mergers and acquisitions since diversification synergies are considered to surpass 
domestic synergies (Conn et al., 2003). 
 
2.4.5 Empirical evidence on CBM&A value effects 
In CBM&A, the average value creation for the shareholders of the acquiring firm seem to be 
more positive than for domestic M&A transactions. Markides and Oyon (1998) examined 
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wealth effects of 236 acquisitions between 1975 and 1988 and discovered positive and 
statistically significant wealth effects of 0.4 percent.  Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) studied 
value creation of 383 transactions in the period 1985 to 1995 and found positive but 
statistically insignificant, abnormal returns of 0.3 percent. Other similar studies performed for 
US acquiring firms conclude similar outcomes (Doukas, Travlos, 1988; Markides & Ittner, 
1994).  Campa and Hernando (2004) analyzed 80 European CBM&A transactions during 
1998 to 2000 and discovered abnormal returns of 0.1 percent. Lowinski, Schiereck & Thomas 
(2004) also  conclude positive effects for CBM&A shareholders in his study of 91 CBM&A 
deals between 1990 and 2001 and finding statistically significant shareholder value creation 
of 1.3 percent. 
The majority of previous literature within the field of shareholder wealth effects focuses on 
firm or deal factors, such as the relative size of the target to the acquirer, the method of 
payment, strategic direction and experience of the acquiring firm. Even though some studies 
have included macroeconomic factors such as exchange rates (Moeller & Schlingemann, 
2005) few expand on it in greater detail. Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) study wealth effects 
for acquiring shareholders in 112 CBM&A transactions between 1982 and 1991. The purpose 
of the study is to examine the effect of country diversification on shareholder wealth. The 
authors state that the effects increase with higher differences between the acquiring and target 
country. Furthermore, the authors investigate the influence of exchange rates as well as firm 
and deal factors to explain value creation for shareholders.  
The influence of macroeconomic factors on wealth effects is further investigated by another 
study of Kiymaz. Kiymaz (2004) scrutinizes 207 CBM&A transactions between 1989 and 
1999 and the wealth effects are analyzed by testing macroeconomic factors such as the 
economic condition, level of economic development and exchange rate volatility. Moreover, 
firm and deal factors are also included.  The results show that macroeconomic factors are 
essential when clarifying wealth effects in CBM&A. Kiymaz (2004) discovered that the 
foreign economic condition and exchange rate volatility influence shareholder wealth 
negatively. Furthermore, transactions in developing nations proved to result in higher value 
creation than deals in developed countries. The strength of the foreign currency and the 
correlation in GNP growth between the two nations do not seem to influence shareholder 
wealth. Markides & Ittner (1994) carried out another study that analyzes the impact of 
macroeconomic factors. They examine wealth effects from 276 CBM&A between 1975 and 
1988. The study includes macroeconomic variables such as tax regulations, the strength of the 
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US dollar, and the difference in GDP growth between the acquiring and target nation as well 
as the inflation. The authors concluded that the strength of the US dollar had a positive 
relationship with shareholder wealth effects but none of the remaining variables proved to 
impact value creation.  
To summarize, when studying shareholder wealth effects, firm and deal specific variables are 
often tested. From the few studies examining the effects of macroeconomic factors, the 
majority found a significant correlation between these and shareholder wealth. However, 
different studies have investigated different variables and the majority focuses on a limited set 
of variables, which do not include the whole spectrum; economic, financial, cultural and 
political variables.   
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter begins initially by explaining the research approach of the thesis and continues 
by describing the criterion for collection and process for the data. The implementation of the 
study is described thoroughly in the event study after which the explanatory variables and 
regression model is specified. The chapter ends with method limitations; reliability and 
validity. 
 
3.1 Research approach 
The methodology applied in this thesis was built around a comprehensive review of CBM&A 
literature from theory and empirical results. The authors research approach is best described 
as deductive, meaning that hypotheses were formulated based on existing theories regarding 
macroeconomic and cultural factors affecting shareholder wealth (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
These hypotheses were then the fundamental focus during the empirical data collection 
process, which consisted of data from a large sample of UK acquiring companies.  
Subsequently, in order to test the hypotheses we applied a quantitative method through the use 
of an event study (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The quantitative approach was therefore the most 
appropriate since the purpose of the thesis was to draw general and statistical conclusions 
from a large sample rather than focusing on a single transaction (Holme & Solvang, 1997). 
Moreover, the quantitative nature of the approach makes it replicable ensuring that the 
analysis is objective (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The findings were statistically tested to 
determine whether or not to reject the hypotheses using the mentioned quantitative strategy 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
 
3.2 Choice of acquirer and target 
3.2.1 The acquirer 
Traditionally, developed countries, and in particular the developed countries of the European 
Union (EU15) and the United States, have been the largest acquirers in CBM&As. Over the 
2003-2005 period, developed countries accounted for 85 percent of the $465 billion cross-
border M&A, 47 percent and 23 percent of which respectively pertain EU15 and US firms 
either as acquirer or as target countries (UNCTAD, 2006). According to recent reports from 
Allen & Overy (2012), UK confirmed its position as the world’s second largest cross-border 
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acquirer and the world's largest flow of M&A transactions exists between U.S. and U.K. 
Furthermore, as non-member of the European Single Currency, the UK can influence its own 
interest rate and other macroeconomic policies, as opposed to other European economies. A 
majority of CBM&A had UK firms as the acquirers, signifying an extensive UK-BRIC and 
UK-MINT economic relation with the intended target countries. The combination of the 
aforementioned factors is what made the U.K as a suitable acquirer candidate to investigate. 
 
3.2.2 The targets 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of macroeconomic and cultural 
conditions in CBM&A transactions the selection of countries to investigate was imperative 
for the outcome for the study. Macroeconomic and cultural conditions differ a great deal 
depending on extent of the development of the country. In order to capture as large a variation 
as possible for the event study, we selected a range of countries dependent on their stage of 
development and geographical location. The countries that were selected were either 
categorized into developed or developing. 
 
Developed countries 
Although there is no universal, agreed-upon criterion for what makes a country developed or 
developing, one generally accepted method of measuring the development is the use of a 
Human Development Index (HDI), which serves as a frame of reference for both social and 
economic development.  Thus, for the event study, the top ten countries with the highest HDI-
score were selected. The countries selected in descending order: Norway, Australia, United 
States, Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan (UN 
development index, 2014). 
 
Developing countries 
The developing countries were broken down into two further sub-categories, consisting of two 
acronyms coined by economists Jim O’Neill, former employee at Goldman Sachs. These 
acronyms are referred as BRICS and MIKT and are widely recognized in the academic world 
as developing countries with high growth potential (O’Neill, 2013). 
BRICS whose initials stand for the developing markets Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
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Africa was originally coined by Jim O’Neill, a global economist at Goldman Sachs, in 2001. 
Ever since then the vast economic potential of the BRIC countries have become commonplace 
in discussions in the economic, corporate and political settings, turning this Goldman Sachs’s 
invention into more than just a brilliant marketing ploy. These countries are some of the 
largest in the world covering 25 percent of the world’s total landmass; they are home to 
around 40 percent of the world’s population and are increasingly run as global market 
economies (Hult, 2009). 
MIKT is yet another acronym originally coined by Fidelity, a Boston-based asset management 
firm, but also made popular by Jim O'Neill. MIKT refers to the economies of Mexico, 
Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey. The term is primarily used in the economic and financial 
spheres and regarded as the next set of big growth economies after BRICS (O’Neill 2013). 
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3.3 Data collection 
The investigation of wealth creation for acquiring firms in CBM&A for UK firms required a 
significant amount of data. Previous studies within the field have used a range of databases, 
such as CRSP (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993), SDC (Moeller et al., 2004). The authors 
concluded that the most suitable database for our purpose was to use Zephyr, a comprehensive 
database for M&A transactions and its characteristics. Thompsons Reuters Datastream 
Advanced was used for the collection of secondary data such as, historical stock prices, 
market indices.  
 
Table 2 – Databases and sources 
Data sources  Data  
Datastream database  Exchange rates, market indices, 
  stock prices, interest rates  
Capital IQ  Market to book ratio  
The Hofstede Centre  Country scores for the four cultural 
  dimensions of Hofstede  
Thompson Reuters Eikon database  Firm specific data (company experience)  
The World Development Indicators &   
Macroeconomic data (i.e. GDP, GDP per 
capita,  
Global Development Finance GDP growth rates and inflation rates)  
 database of the World Bank   
The World Governance Indicators  Political stability indicator  
database of the World Bank    
Zephyr database  Deal specific information (i.e. deal type, 
  deal value, method of payment and SIC codes)  
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3.4 Selection criteria 
For the initial selections sample the following restrictions Zephyr database were applied on 
the data, after which some further selection criteria were made by the authors. 
Selection criteria applied in Zephyr     
 
     Criterion                                                           Remaining deals
    
- All available transactions          1,157,052
      
- The acquiring company was British              101,755
      
- The acquiring company was listed on London Stock Exchange          29,778 
 
- The M&A is announced between 1997-01-01 and 2013-01-01  
and the transaction was “announced”                    26,360
    
- The target was based in: Brazil, Russia, India, China,  
South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway,  
Australia, United States, Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand,  
Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan              3,667
  
- Type of transaction: Merger & Acquisition (All other types such 
as: IPO, Joint Venture, MBO, MBI, Demerger, Minority stake,  
and share buyback were excluded)              1,913
            
- Acquiring company purchased a majority stake (51%)            1,703 
 
- All acquisitions have a known value             1,301 
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Selection criteria applied by authors 
 
Criterion                   Remaining deals 
- Method of payment was available                                   1,123
    
- The acquiring and target firms’ primary UK SIC-codes 
 were available from Zephyr               1,056
           
- The acquisition exceeded £5 million                 779
       
- No duplicate offers for same target (only first one was used)               768
      
- Acquiring company:  no more than one M&A within a  
eleven-day period (event window)                 746 
 
- Stock prices available  -295 and +10 trading days  
of the announcement                                       655
       
- Relative size: The value of the transaction is at least 
1 % of acquiring company’s equity                 540
    
     
 
The requirement for the acquiring firms selected for this thesis was that they had to be listed 
in the London Stock Exchange, with an announcement between the years 1997-01-01 and 
2012-12-31. The acquiring companies needed to be listed so that the authors could obtain 
share price performance. However, since only acquirer value was examined, it was not 
necessary for the target company to be publicly listed. The deal value also had to be known in 
order to control for the relative size of the transactions as described later. The primary 
reasoning behind examining acquisitions from the aforementioned period is that it gave the 
study a substantial sample size but also enabled the authors to review a complete trough-to-
peak-to-trough macroeconomic cycle in accordance with Herd & McManus (2012).  
 
 
38 
 
As evident from 2.3 in our theory chapter, the size of the deal has an impact on the value 
creation. It was therefore necessary to mitigate the impact of size by excluding deal with a 
relative size of less than 5 percent. According to Walker (2000), the relative size can be 
defined as value of the deal divided by the acquiring company’s market value three months 
preceding the announcement date. Finally, the acquiring company needs to have been listed 
on the stock exchange for at least six months prior to the acquisition announcement in order to 
calculate a fair normal return. Firms who have engaged in multi-acquisitions during the event 
window will not be included since it will be difficult to measure the effect of each transaction. 
With all necessary criterions fulfilled we were left with 540 related CBM&A deals. 
To achieve enough variation for the event study, the authors decided that 200 observations 
would be sufficient and was reasonable given the timeframe. 100 observations were selected 
from the developed countries and 100 from the developing countries. The number of 
transactions in the countries varies a great deal. As a result, there is an over-representation of 
CBM&A deals for some countries, such as USA and Germany. For this reason the authors 
introduced a random sample selection method based on the pool of observations which 
satisfied the selection criterion. Every available observation from the developing sample was 
chosen since they in total did not amount to 100. As for the developed sample, the countries 
had to be represented ten times each, amounting to 100 observations. Whenever there were 
more than ten observations for a developed country they were randomly selected from each 
country pool. These observations were randomly selected in Excel. Thus, no developed 
country was represented more than ten times. Whenever there were insufficient observations 
for a country all the available ones were selected. The final sample outcome after the 
randomization is shown in the table 4 in the empirical and analysis chapter. 
 
3.5 Measures of M&A profitability 
There are numerous of different approaches to measure M&A profitability (Bruner 2004). 
Accounting Studies examine financial statements of acquirers before and after acquisitions to 
observe how the performance has changed. Surveys of Executives entail asking a sample of 
executives through a standardized questionnaire whether the acquisition created value. 
Clinical Studies is an inductive research, which focus on one transaction or a small sample in 
great depth, usually deriving from field interviews (Bruner 2004). However, in contrast to the 
aforementioned methods, Event Studies are forward-looking and have since the 1970’s 
arguably dominated the field.  
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3.6 Event Study - measuring short-term abnormal returns 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The fundamental idea of an event study is to observe stock prices around a specific event and 
measure the change due to the event (Peterson, 1989). This event study observed the 
abnormal returns to the shareholder in the interval surrounding the announcement of a 
transaction. The raw return for any given day is the difference in opening and closing prices 
of a stock. The abnormal return therefore is the raw return less the investor’s requirement 
(normal return), which is typically dictated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
(Bruner 2004). By that same logic, normal return can be described as the expected return that 
an investor should anticipate given that an announcement (event) does not taken place. 
In this thesis, the event study methodology was used to examine wealth effects of cross-
border M&A. The wealth of the acquisitions is measured as Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR).  The event study is defined as the day when the acquisition becomes public, i.e. the 
announcement day. The event window only measures the market reaction over a few days, 
thus eliminating the surrounding factors i.e. noise, which can affect the stock price. Even 
though the event study only measures the short-term return, the market has been proven to be 
very effective at pricing the wealth effects and as a result has been a well-established method 
of measuring value creation in M&A (for example, Andrade et al., 2001; Gupta & Misra, 
2007). According to Sirower (1997), the short-term fluctuations in the stock price surrounding 
the announcement date are also a good indication of the stock’s long-term performance. 
 
3.6.2 The Event Study 
There are numerous of different approaches to perform an event study. In this thesis the 
authors chose to work with the market model, which is based on the stock price’s market 
index to estimate the normal return. The market model will be discussed further in depth in 
chapter 3.7.3. The fundamental cornerstone in an event study is defining the announcement 
date, the estimation period and the event window (Benninga, 2008). In conformity with 
MacKinlay (1997), we have used daily intervals instead of monthly in the event study. This 
increases the “power” and yields a better and more reliable result. 
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3.6.3 Announcement date 
In order to measure the wealth effects in M&A for the acquiring company, the authors first 
had to define which date acts as the transaction day, for the event study. Based on previous 
studies such as MacKinlay (1997), Brown & Warner (1985), the authors chose henceforward, 
to define the announcement day as moment the firm announces the M&A transaction to the 
public via a press release. 
 
3.6.4 Estimation period and event window 
The time around the announcement day is called the “event window”. Normal returns are 
estimated using a period prior to the event window: the so-called “estimation period” 
(Peterson, 1989). Diagram 3 illustrates the relationship. 
Diagram 3 – The components of the event study 
 
 
where 
tb  =   The beginning of period used in the estimation of a normal security return 
te  =   The end of period used in the estimation of a normal security return 
t1  =    The first period used in the calculation of abnormal returns 
ta  =   The announcement date 
t2  =   The last period used in the calculation of abnormal returns 
  
Source: Illustration by authors based on Peterson (1989) 
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Estimation period 
In order to employ the market model we had to define the time period in which the normal 
return was estimated. It is important that the estimation of the normal return is not affected by 
the announcement, which is why the estimation period and event window should not overlap 
each other (MacKinlay, 1997). According to Schwert (1996), the market starts to react of 
M&A news 42 days prior to the completion. Kuenzi & Chatterjee (2001) discuss the 
importance of keeping the estimation period separate from the event since it can lead to biased 
results due to leakage of transaction information. To obtain a reliable as possible estimation, 
we used a 45-day respite period between the event window and estimation period, similar to 
Gerbaud & York (2007). To increase the robustness of the results there should be at least 126 
observations in the estimation period. Any fewer then there is a significant risk that the alfa 
and beta coefficients in the market model do not represent reliable proxies of the stock price 
(Benninga, 2008). Furthermore, the use of a longer estimation period will mitigate the errors 
in the estimation of the parameters leading to a more robust study as the correlation between 
the abnormal returns is eliminated (MacKinlay, 1997). Subsequently, to obtain a dependable 
estimation we used a period of 250 trading days, which approximately is equal to a full 
calendar year (Brown & Warner, 1985). The main advantage of using a whole year is that it 
reduces the effects of seasonal variation, which might affect the estimation. However, the use 
of a more extensive period (improved prediction model) must be weighed against the cost of 
the longer period (model parameter instability) (Peterson, 1989). Based on the aforementioned 
reasoning, we chose an estimation period of -296 days to -46 days prior to the announcement 
date. 
 
Event Window 
The event window can be defined as the time frame in which the effects of the value creation 
are captured. The event window often incorporates several days surrounding the actual 
announcement date (MacKinlay, 1997). A great deal of variations of time periods can be used, 
but researchers in general have agreed upon shorter event windows of 3,5,10 or 20 days. 
There is a distinct trade-off when selecting the event window. If it is too narrow then there is a 
risk in missing early market reaction, such as information leakage prior to the announcement. 
On the other hand, too long and there is a risk of capturing the effects of unrelated events 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). A way to mitigate this issue is to measure the results from 
several event windows and therefore the authors selected event windows consisting of 11 days 
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[-5,+5] and 3 days [-1,+1]. The selections are empirically supported from its implementation 
in previous research, such as (Aybar and Ficic, 2009) and (Ma et al 2009). 
 
3.7 Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
Wealth effects for shareholders are measured by the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), 
which in turn is defined as the aggregate of the abnormal returns. 
 
3.7.1 Abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns are measured by subtracting the normal return from raw return: 
 
ARit = Rit - NRit 
where 
ARit  = the abnormal return on stock i on day t 
Rit = the raw return on stock i on day t 
NRit = the normal return on stock i on day t 
 
3.7.2 Raw return 
The raw return for any given day is the difference in opening and closing prices of a stock 
(Bruner 2004). It is calculated using the following formula: 
 

Rit 
(Pit  Pit1)
Pit1
 
where 
Rit = the raw return on stock i on day t 
Pit = the stock price of stock i on day t 
Pit-1 = the stock price of stock i on day t-1 
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3.7.3 Normal return 
There are several approaches to measure normal returns. The two of the most prominent 
methods that are generally applied are the constant mean return model and the market model 
(MacKinlay, 1997). According to the same author, the former method assumes that the mean 
for any given stock is constant over time, whereas, the market model assumes a linear 
relationship between market return and stock return. Even though the constant mean return 
model is generally regarded as a simplified model it has proven to yield similar results as the 
more refined ones (Brown & Warner, 1980 and 1985).  
That notwithstanding, the market model has an advantage over the constant mean return 
model in that it takes into account market movements. Stock price changes could derive from 
overall market movements rather than the event. This would mean that the results are biased 
as stock price movements are instead partially or completely produced by the market. The 
constant mean return model attempts to solve this problem by introducing a market index to 
represent normal returns so that market movements are included. However, this solution 
assumes that all stocks follow the exact market movements, in other words,  is equal to one. 
This approach does not obviously accurately represent the true market conditions. The market 
model allows for different co-movements of stocks by estimating the  for each stock. 
Subsequently, the portion of the return that is related to the variation in the market’s return is 
removed (MacKinley, 1997). 
Since the purpose of this study was to examine the event effects, the most appropriate method 
therefore was the market model. The choice of market index was divided into four groups 
depending on where the acquiring firm was listed on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE). 
This was introduced to achieve as representative as possible market index for each firm. The 
four different indices applied were: FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE all-share and FTSE small-
cap. 
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Market model 
 
Rit = i + iRmt+ it 
where 
Rit =  the return on stock i on day t 
Rmt =  the return on the market index m on day t 
,  =  regression coefficients 
it = error term 
 
The market model was applied to obtain the fitted values of the regression coefficients. The 
regression coefficients were calculated for the entire estimation period. The fitted values of 
the regression coefficients were then used to estimate the normal returns.  
 

NRit  ˆ i 
ˆ iRmt  
where 
NRit =  the normal return on stock i on day t 
Rmt =  the return on the market index m on day t 

ˆ , ˆ  = the fitted values of the regression coefficients 
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3.7.4 Calculating CAR 
The abnormal returns for each security over the event window [t1, t2] were aggregated to form 
individual cumulative abnormal returns (Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, 1997).  

CAR (t1,t2) ARit
tt1
t2

 
 
The average CAR for N observations can then be calculated as follows: 

CAR (t1,t2)
1
N
CARi (t1,t2)
i1
N

 
 

CAR for the periods [-1,1] and [-5,5] surrounding the date of the announcement were 
calculated. 
 
3.7.5 Significance and hypotheses testing 
To determine the extent to which the results can be generalized in the study a test for 
statistical significance was carried out, where the degree of reliability for the mean of the 
sample was determined. The sample cannot be generalized if there is a sample error, which in 
turn means that the results would not have shown high enough validity (Bryman & Bell, 
2011).  
According to Körner & Wahlgren (2006), depending on the distribution of the data and size of 
the observations, a range of statistical tests can be carried out. The t-test is a parametric test, 
which can be employed if the sample is normally distributed. If the sample size consists of at 
least 30 observations, the distribution can be assumed to be approximately normally 
distributed, in accordance with the central limit theorem. The disadvantage of using 
parametric tests is that the distribution can be affected by extreme values. Non-parametric 
tests, such as rank and sign tests, can be performed even if the sample is not normally 
distributed and contains extreme values (Körner & Wahlgren, 2006).  
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The authors chose to carry out a t-test in Excel since the data sample was assumed to be 
normally distributed and did not contain any extreme values.  
 

t 
( )
(s N)
 
where 
 

   = mean value of sample 
   = mean value of population 
s  = standard error of sample 
N  = number of observations 
 
 
The hypothesis testing commences with a construction of a null-hypothesis, which includes 
two variables not related to each other (Körner & Wahlgren, 2006). The null-hypothesis of 
this thesis, states that there is no relationship between the change in stock price and 
announcement of an M&A transaction.  An appropriate statistical significance level () was 
selected, which is a measure of the probability that the null-hypothesis is rejected even though 
it should have been accepted. In the statistical programs, a p-value (probability value) is 
calculated, which is the probability that’s the sample is the randomly distributed, expressed as 
a percentage.  For this study, the authors decided on a significance level of 5 percent, which is 
the critical value where a null-hypothesis should be rejected.  
To identify whether M&A creates value for the acquirer, as debated in the problem 
discussion, the null-hypothesis is constructed in the following way: 
H1 : There are abnormal returns for the acquiring firm related the announcement day of an 
M&A (AR ≠ 0) 
A t-test was performed on abnormal returns (AR) for every day during the event window, as 
well as on the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). It important to note that the test is based 
on the mean values AAR and CAAR. Subsequently the following hypotheses were 
formulated: 
H1 : There are cumulative abnormal returns for the acquiring firm related the announcement 
of an M&A over the event window (CAR ≠ 0) 
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3.8 Regression analysis 
A multiple linear regression was applied in order to further investigate the factors affecting 
abnormal returns and whether it can be explained by differences in macroeconomic 
conditions. The choice of model for determining these effects was based in part due to the 
nature of the problem discussion and the purpose but also the limitations and assumptions in 
the statistical model. To explain a correlation between a dependent variable and independent 
explanatory variables, a regression analysis is the most appropriate (Körner & Wahlgren, 
2006). The more independent explanatory variables included in the regression, the worse the 
precision for each variable, which is why the application of a simpler model is justified 
(Ramanathan, 2002). Even though the inclusion of more variables increases the overall 
determination coefficient (R2), the degrees of freedom (df) are reduced for each included 
variable resulting in a weak strength of the test (Ramanathan, 2002). Weaker test strength 
increased the risk of a type II error, i.e., the risk of not rejecting a false null hypothesis 
(Körner & Wahlgren, 2006). Therefore there is a trade-off between high determination 
coefficient and test strength. 
The interpretation of regression models is partly carried out by examining the determination 
coefficient, which explains to what extent the dependent variable is explained by the all the 
independent variables together.  The significance level of the entire regression model is 
measured by an f-test whereas the significance level of each of the independent variables is 
measured by a t-test.  If the f-test is significant, at least one of the independent variables has a 
linear relationship with the dependent variable. If any of the independent variables fails to 
fulfil the t-test, correlation between the variables could exist leading to an overlapping 
determination coefficient. A high p-value indicates that the explanatory variable should be 
excluded from the model (Westerlund, 2005).  
The multiple linear regression was carried out in Eviews. A cross-sectional (OLS) regression 
of factors affecting abnormal returns was carried out on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
measured in percent, to identify the impact of the determinants on the value creation around 
the announcement date. The choice of independent variables was based on previous research 
and theory as well as the availability of data. The regression was carried out on the whole data 
sample from period 1997-01-01 to 2013-01-01. Furthermore, two separate regressions were 
performed, one consisting only of data from developed countries and the other from 
developing. In the case that an independent variable had a high p-value, the model was would 
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be evaluated to possible adjustment, by excluding such variables and a new regression would 
be constructed consisting of remaining variables. The regression model is illustrated as below: 
 
 

CAR[t1;t2]i 01ix1i2ix2i...kixki i, i1, ..., N  
 
where 
  

CAR[t1;t2]i                     = cumulative abnormal returns on stock i from day t1 to day t2 (T1 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T2),  

xki                     = factors affecting cumulative abnormal returns,  

0                     = the regression constant,  

ki                     = coefficients of the factors,  

 i                   = the error term of stock i. 
 
3.8.1 Diagnostic testing 
In order for the regression model to show reliable results, some assumptions and criteria for 
the data sample had to be fulfilled. The error terms, so-called residuals, had to be independent 
of each other, normally distributed, homoscedastic and have the same distribution (Davidson 
& MacKinnon, 2004). All together, six criteria had to be satisfied (Westerlund, 2005). 
1. The dependent variable had to be correctly described by the chosen linear function model. 
With a RESET-test the model can be examined against the existence of incorrectly omitted 
variables as well as incorrect function form. If an independent explanatory variable is omitted, 
the function model inaccurately specified, which means that assumption one and two do not 
hold (Westerlund, 2005). RESET-test shows that the model does not satisfy the criterion for a 
perfect linear model.  
2. The expected value of the residuals has to be equal to zero (Westerlund, 2005). According 
to the RESET-test the same reasoning as above has to be applied. 
3. The residuals have to have the same variance, i.e. have to be homoscedastic. By performing 
a White-test it is possible to determine whether the assumption is satisfied and furthermore 
enables correction for heteroscedasticity (Westerlund, 2005).  
 
 
49 
 
4. The residuals cannot be auto correlated. To detect auto correlation a LM-test can be 
performed (Westerlund, 2005). 
5. The independent variables are not random and thus cannot be written as an exact linear 
function of each other. Multicollinearity in the data sample can be detected with the help of a 
correlation matrix. There is a problem if the correlation exceeds 0.8 between two variables. 
(Westerlund, 2005). 
6. The residuals have to be normally distributed. With a Jarque-Bera test the data sample can 
be tested for normal distribution if the number of observations falls short of 30 observations 
(Westerlund, 2005).  
 
3.8.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the regression analysis as shown in the equation above was the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of stock i, from day t1 to day t2. The regressions were 
run against the CAR derived from the market model and for the event windows [-1,1] and [-
5,5]. 
 
3.8.3 Independent variables 
The categories affecting value in CBM&A are several and the authors divided them into the 
following five categories: i) macroeconomic and cultural factors, ii) firm factors and iii) deal 
factor iv) geographical v) industry variables. The purpose of this study was to focus on 
macroeconomic and cultural conditions. 
 
Gross Domestic Product (LN_GDP) 
The economic size of a country can be measured by the GDP. In our thesis, the variable GDP 
was calculated by logging GDP values of the year before the announcement (GDP values in 
2005 constant US dollars). As is evident from section 2.4.3, CBM&A involves a significant 
investment. Large investments imply high risk, which can only be justified in larger markets. 
Engaging in M&A in countries with a larger economic size is expected to increase 
shareholder wealth.  
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Gross Domestic Product per Capita (LN_GDP_CAP) 
A good complement to the size of the economy is to take the economic condition into 
consideration. This represents the purchasing power of a country and is measured by the GDP 
per capita. GDP per Capita was calculated in the same way as GDP meaning that the values 
in the year prior to the announcement were logged (GDP per capita values in 2005 constant 
US dollars). It was important to put the economic size of an economy in relation to its 
population i.e. a large economy might be the result of a large population instead of a strong 
purchasing power.  
 
Gross Domestic Product Annual Growth (GDP_G) 
As a further complement to the aforementioned factors, a third dimension indicates the 
economic prospect of a country. This was measured as the annual GDP growth rate. The 
variable GDP Growth consisted of the annual growth rates the year prior to the 
announcement. As described in section 2.4.3, one of the key motives behind CBM&A is to 
capture the GDP growth of the target country. As mentioned, GDP growth represents the 
future prospect of a country. Economies with higher growth are therefore considered to be in 
the ascendency, which is often followed, by an increased purchasing power and ultimately a 
higher demand for products. In the developed countries, markets tend to be saturated and with 
slow growth rates. Consequently, companies might seek to exploit markets where the GDP 
growth is higher. These countries are more often than not, developing countries. Therefore, 
firms acquiring companies in high growth markets are expected to generate positive 
shareholder wealth effects. In addition to capturing the growth, companies establish footholds 
in future markets which further has a positive impact on wealth effects.  
 
Interest rate (INT) 
There are other important economic measurements, which indicate the health of the economic 
condition in a country. In any acquisition, an important component is the financing of the 
transaction. A target country’s interest rate is a measurement of the cost of external capital. 
Countries with a stable economic condition and easy access to capital tend to have lower 
interest rates. Subsequently, financing acquisitions is less costly. The variable Interest Rate 
was measured as the difference in interest rate between the target and acquiring company for 
the year of the transaction. To attain consistency, the interest rate equivalent to each country’s 
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central bank rate was chosen.  The larger the difference, the more expensive the financing of 
the transaction will be in the target country compared to the acquirer company. It was 
expected that the larger the difference in interest rate between target and acquirer country, the 
larger the positive wealth effects for shareholders. There are two theoretical reasons for this, 
as to why this is the case. Firstly, there is a possibility to gain financial synergy through 
access to external funds at a lower cost of capital in the acquirer country. Secondly, 
competitors in the target country have to use more expensive ways of raising capital (Uddin & 
Boateng, 2010).   
 
Inflation (INFL) 
Another important economic measurement, which indicates the health of the economic 
condition in a country, is the rate of inflation. The variable inflation simply measures the 
inflation rate of the target country for the year of the transaction. As described in section 
2.4.3, inflation indicates an adverse economic condition because of the value loss of capital, 
the encouragement of underinvestment, the distortion of resource allocation and the 
depression of the market. Therefore, it was expected that inflation in the target country is 
negatively correlated with shareholder wealth (McKinsey, 2010). 
 
Exchange rate (EXC_RATE) 
The relative strength or weakness of the acquiring versus the target currency can affect the 
premiums paid in a CBM&A. A measurement was implemented to account for the strength of 
the foreign exchange rate. Exchange rate strength was devised in accordance to Kiymaz 
(2004) who used a two-step approach. Firstly, the exchange rate of the foreign currency in 
terms of British Pounds in the year of the announcement is subtracted from the average 
exchange rate of the foreign currency for the selected study period. Secondly, this difference 
is then divided by the average exchange rate. A positive value denotes that the foreign 
currency is stronger relative the British Pound and vice versa. The impact the exchange rate 
has on the acquirer is still unknown since expected future cash flows is a function of future 
exchange rates. Overall, acquirers would benefit from a strong home currency at the time of 
the transaction and a weak home currency at the time of the repatriation of dividends and cash 
flows (Kiymaz, 2004).  
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Political Stability (POL_STAB) 
In addition to the economic conditions in the target country mentioned previously, firms who 
engage CBM&A deals also take political stability factors into consideration. The variable 
Political Stability entails numerous risks, such as internal and external conflicts, regime 
discontinuity and changes in the legal system (Meldrum, 2000; Brockmann, 2007). It was 
expected that there is a positive correlation between political stability and wealth effects for 
shareholders. The World Bank Political Stability Indication was used to determine the 
political stability in the target country. The indicator was transformed into a scale ranging 
from zero to five, where five indicates strong political stability. The variable measures the 
political stability score of the target country in the year prior to the transaction. Since the 
index is highly related with other World Bank indicators such as, Voice and Accountability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption and thus 
was used as a proxy for the these factors.  
 
Culture (CULT) 
Another non-economically related factor is the variable Culture, measured using Hofstede’s 
four Cultural dimensions; Power distance, Individualism, Masculinity and Uncertainty 
avoidance. To compute the variable, the difference between acquiring and target scores for all 
four cultural dimensions were calculated individually. Thereafter, these differences were 
added together to give each country an aggregated difference. A higher cultural disparity 
score signifies a larger cultural difference and according to Majidi (2007) cultural differences 
can be the underlying cause for miscommunications and conflicts. Large cultural differences 
were therefore expected to cause negative wealth effects for shareholders.  
 
3.8.4 Control variables 
When constructing a linear multiple regression it was necessary to create control variables to 
increase strength of the outcome in the testing of hypotheses. The control variables included 
in the regression model were all dummy variables. A dummy variable is a binary variable that 
only takes two values, 0 or 1. It takes the value of 1 if a statement is true and 0 otherwise 
(Westerlund, 2005). Variables that, based on previous research, have shown to affect the 
value creation of M&A and thus important to include in the regression were categorized into 
the following groups; 
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Firm variables 
The dummy variable Market-to-Book (MTB) was used as a proxy for the performance 
previous to the transaction of the M&A. Firms with high MTB were expected to achieve less 
abnormal returns than firms with low MTB (Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). The acquiring firm’s 
MTB ratio collected in the year prior to the transaction. The variable takes a value of 1 if the 
firm’s MTB ratio was higher than the S&P 500 related industry average for that firm and 0 
otherwise. 
The dummy variable Acquiring Firm Experience (EXP01) refers to whether the acquiring 
firm has undertaken M&A transactions previous to the current transaction. Empirically, 
literature is divided on the impact on the wealth effects; however Haleblian & Finkelstein 
(1999) and Beckman & Haunschild (2002) showed a positive relationship between the 
experience of the acquiring firm and wealth effect for the shareholders. The variable takes the 
value of 1 if the acquiring firm has performed at least five M&A deals prior to the current 
transaction and 0 otherwise. 
 
Deal variables 
Method of Payment (MOP) variable reflects the market reaction. A transaction purchased with 
cash indicated an undervalued target price, meaning that the true value of the stock is higher. 
Furthermore, a payment in stocks would indicate the opposite, i.e. that the stock value is 
overpriced (Kiymaz, 2004). Subsequently, cash payment is expected to have a positive impact 
on wealth effects for shareholders. The variable takes the value of 1 if the payment is financed 
in cash and 0 otherwise. 
The variable Relative Size (SIZE) was calculated by dividing target size of firm by the market 
capitalization of the acquiring firm in the year prior to the announcement. The deal value (in 
£) was used as a proxy for the target size. Previous research has shown that there is a positive 
relation between relative size of the target to the acquirer (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Markides 
& Ittner, 1994; Moeller & Schlingmann, 2005).  The variable takes the value of 1 if the size of 
the deal is larger than 10 percent and 0 otherwise. 
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Geographical variables 
The dummy variable Language (LANG) refers to a common spoken language in both 
acquiring and target countries. According to Kiymaz (2004), a common spoken language, 
results in lower transactions costs, since it is believed that companies are able to communicate 
and understand each other efficiently. Therefore, a common language is expected to have a 
positive impact on wealth effects. The variable takes the value of 1 if the official language in 
target and acquiring countries is the same and 0 otherwise.  
The dummy variable Geographic Location (GEO) refers to the effects of geographical 
diversification. Regions vary in global integration and consequently have different potential in 
terms of diversification (Kiymaz 2004). It is expected that geographical diversification has a 
positive effect on shareholder wealth. The variable takes the value of 1 if the target country is 
situated on the same continent as the acquiring country and 0 otherwise.  
 
Industry variables 
The dummy variable Industry (IND) illustrates the potential industrial diversification between 
target and acquiring firms. Firms differ in their structure and therefore have different 
international diversification potential (Kiymaz, 2004). It is expected that firms in different 
industries will create diversification gains and therefore positively affect shareholder wealth. 
The variable takes the value of 1 if, the two first digits of the primary UK SIC code 
correspond and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.9 Method limitations 
3.9.1 Measurement and interpreting difficulties  
Sometimes difficulties can arise when defining the effect of the acquisition on the acquiring 
firm’s stock price. The stock price reflects whether there are differences in expectations 
surrounding a transaction; if the transaction is expected, the effect is already included in the 
stock price. For firms regularly engaging in M&A, a future transaction might already be 
partially or fully incorporated in the stock price. This in turn means that the stock price 
change of this firm is less significant than compared to firms who do not have a regular M&A 
strategy. If however, abnormal returns still exist, this information only reflects the return from 
the specific transaction and not the M&A strategy of the firm (Jensen & Ruback, 1983).  
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Another important aspect in this study is taking into account when a transaction is expected to 
have a positive net present value (NPV). If the stock price movement post transaction 
corresponds with the expected return, this might indicate that the company has satisfied the 
investors’ required return.  In that case the normal return in connection with the transaction 
can be considered as acceptable from the firm and investors’ point of view. In this type of 
study, however, a positive NPV is commonly associated with positive abnormal returns. As a 
result, the transaction can have a positive NPV but not as high as the market would have 
expected, leading to a drop in stock price even though the transaction has created value 
(Guest, Bild & Runsten, 2010). 
Furthermore, another factor contributing to lowering the overall change in stock price for the 
transaction is if the acquiring firm has a market capitalization, which is significantly larger 
than the purchase price. Possible gains in connection with the transaction will then to a lesser 
extent affect the acquiring firm (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). 
A rational reaction from the investors is necessary in order for abnormal returns to take place. 
If reactions are not rational, the demand for the stock does not increase even though the 
transaction was shown to be a good investment. As a result the stock price does not increase 
which means that there is no difference between raw return and expected return (Jarrell & 
Poulsen, 1989). 
 
3.9.2 Validity  
Validity is defined as the absence of systematic measurement errors (Lundahl & Skärvad, 
2009). Validity is classified into two parts, external and internal. In order to achieve internal 
validity the measuring instrument should only be used for its intended purpose. Additionally, 
it is necessary to be conscious of whether the measuring instrument is measuring the correct 
data and to the proper extent (Lundahl & Skärvad, 2009). Bryman and Bell (2011) describes 
the factor that has a causal influence as the independent variable and its effect as the 
dependent variable. The internal validity of this study is difficult to determine, since it cannot 
be certain that the abnormal returns, dependent variable, are only an effect of the transaction, 
the independent variable. For this study it was impossible to fully isolate the external effects 
on the dependent variable. To mitigate this problem the event window selected was short thus 
reducing the probability of outside effects; however, there was still a possibility that other 
factors such as dividend announcements played a role (MacKinlay, 1997). In such an event 
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there is covariance between the variables but not necessarily causality. In addition to 
covariance, in order for causality to exist, it is necessary to control for all other relations as 
well as the relevant variables (Jacobsen, 2002).  
External validity measures how well the chosen indicator and the relation examined 
corresponds, not only for the specific study but also in general (Bryman & Bell, 2011). For 
this study it was important to be able to draw conclusions regarding the observations in the 
data sample, which can be applied for the whole population, i.e. all firms on the London Stock 
Exchange within the selected time frame.  Nevertheless, the study should first and foremost 
give indications regarding how the stock price can be affected by an M&A transaction and the 
underlying reasons. Since the method in thesis, event study and abnormal returns, is a 
common occurrence in studies such as this, it can therefore be replicated for new 
circumstances with different selection criteria. 
Construct validity is defined to which degree a test measures what it claims to be measuring 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). For the quantitative approach that was selected for this thesis, the 
question regarding construct validity addresses whether the shareholder return correctly 
reflects the wealth creation for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. In order to asses the 
construct validity the measurement has to be reliable and not vary. The reliability of the study 
is a requirement for the validity to be achieved (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
 
3.9.3 Reliability 
The measurement reliability can be defined as the absence of random measurement errors 
(Lundahl & Skärvad, 2009). The reliability is partly affected by who performs the 
measurement but also by how it is performed. These two factors could cause the measurement 
to be impacted by coincidences and thus the outcomes would not be identical if they were to 
be repeated. As mentioned before, reliability is a requirement for the validity to be achieved. 
In order to accomplish the upmost attainable level of reliability, the authors constructed a 
system of formulas in Excel, which were consistently applied throughout the entire selection 
of transactions. This method is in accordance with the guidelines set by Benninga of how data 
sampling for event studies in Excel should be performed (Benninga, 2008). Regular random 
samples were frequently carried out to mitigate the risk of incorrect data entry. The authors 
critically scrutinized all results in the study and thus it could easily be replicated. 
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4. RESULTS & ANALYSIS  
In this chapter the authors first present the characteristics of the data collection. The results 
are then simultaneously presented and analysed based on any similarities, differences or 
patterns that have arisen compared to the relevant theoretical research.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Data Analysis 
The whole sample consisted of 151 transactions between 1997 and 2013 as shown in table 3 
and diagram 4. Based on the distribution of observations over the years, there is a pattern, 
where most of the transactions are carried out between the years 2005-2008 and 2010-2012. 
This reflects the M&A activity during the period and the general business cycle.  
 
Table 3 & Diagram 4 – Sample distribution per year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In accordance with the methodology of the study, the 151 observations are distributed across 
19 countries, 10 developed and 9 developing. All observations from the developing countries 
that fulfilled the selection criterion have been selected, all together 64 observations. 
Furthermore, in order to create an even as possible distribution, ten observations for each 
Year Observations 
1997 4 
1998 6 
1999 7 
2000 8 
2001 5 
2002 3 
2003 6 
2004 8 
2005 10 
2006 13 
2007 13 
2008 16 
2009 8 
2010 11 
2011 16 
2012 17 
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developed country were selected apart from Japan (5) and New Zealand (2), totalling 87 
observations. The distribution can be seen in table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Sample distribution per country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company size, expressed as market capitalisation varied a great deal across out whole sample 
and the authors wanted to capture effects from both sides of the spectrum. As described in the 
methodology, it was therefore important to assign a representative index to each company. 
The distribution of market indices is shown in table 5.  
Table 5 – Sample distribution per market index 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Index Observations   
FTSE 100 60   
FTSE 250 50   
FTSE Small Cap 22   
FTSE All-Share 19   
      
Target Country Observations 
Australia 10 
Brazil 13 
China 5 
Germany 10 
India 9 
Indonesia 5 
Ireland 10 
Japan 5 
Mexico 3 
Netherlands 10 
New Zealand 2 
Norway 10 
Russia 9 
South Africa 10 
South Korea 2 
Sweden 10 
Switzerland 10 
Turkey 8 
United States  10 
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The average size of acquiring and target firms are presented and shown below. 
Average size of acquiring firm (pre-deal market capitalization, Mil £) 7403 
Average size of transaction (deal value, Mil £) 1083 
 
Table 6 – Distribution of dummy variables 
                    
  Industry 
Method of 
Payment Market to Book Experience   
  Same Different Cash Other High Low Yes No   
  89 62 108 43 71 80 112 39   
                    
  Geography Language Size EM/DV   
  EU 
NON 
EU Same Other >10% <10% Developing Developed   
  77 74 52 99 56 95 64 87   
                    
                    
                    
As shown in table 6, the distribution of observations for each dummy variable is fairly even, 
thus there is enough variation to include them in the regression model. Furthermore, the 
authors had previously decided to investigate the impact that hostile versus friendly 
transactions had on shareholder wealth, but since all but one of the 151 observations were 
friendly, the dummy variable was excluded from the regression model.  
 
4.2 Cumulative abnormal return analysis 
4.2.1 Results 
 
Comparison and choice of event windows 
As described in the methodology chapter, the event study consisted of two different event 
windows where cumulative abnormal returns were examined over a 5 as well as an 11 day 
period. The results for both event windows are displayed in table 7. 
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Table 7- Abnormal average returns over event windows 
          
  T-test P-value Standard dev. Average 
CAAR 5 0,07380 0,94126 0,06956 -0,01060 
CAAR 11 0,04668 0,96283 0,07713 -0,01259 
          
As evident from table 7, both event windows are not significant at any level. There is only a 
marginal difference between the two in terms of standard deviation and both show a similar 
negative average CAR of approximately one percent. It should be noted that it is statistically 
more likely to receive significance the longer the event window is, thus no major conclusions 
can be drawn from the results.  
Henceforward, the authors decided only to further analyse the effects during the five-day 
event window. The reasoning behind this decision was concluded from the examination of the 
multiple linear regressions that were carried out. See tables 11 and 12. As evident when 
comparing the results from the two regressions, CAR 5 better captured the effects of the 
independent variables displayed as the determination coefficient and its corresponding p-
value. Based on these results the authors concluded that the market responds to the 
announcement relatively quickly, thus the CAR 5 model is more appropriate.  
The results for the CAR 5 event window are presented and divided into three groups, the 
entire sample (table 11), the developed sample (table 14) and the developing sample (table 
13). Each point in time (T), all represent henceforward the closing prices of that day. The 
difference between T-1 and T0 is therefore the stock price increase on the announcement day 
of the transaction (T0). The average abnormal return (AAR) and the cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) for the entire sample is illustrated in the table 8. As apparent, the 
average abnormal returns for the entire sample are not substantially different from zero and 
lies in between an interval around zero. A small degree of negative abnormal return is 
observed around T0. This means that the raw return does not exceed the expected return over 
the event window, which can be noticed by observing CAAR. CAAR for the entire event 
window amounts to approximately minus one percent.  
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Table 8 – Overview of event window for entire sample (151 observations) 
  T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 CAR 
AAR 0,295% 0,007% 
-
0,901% -0,170% -0,308%   
CAAR 0,295% 0,303% 
-
0,599% -0,769% -1,076%   
Number deals with positive abnormal 
returns 85 74 68 73 81   
Number deals with negative abnormal 
returns 66 77 83 78 70   
Average 0,00295 0,00007 
-
0,00901 
-
0,00170 
-
0,00308 -0,01060 
Standard deviation 0,01875 0,02358 0,04809 0,02564 0,02360 0,06956 
T-test 0,05499 0,86586 0,02246 0,36539 0,12212 0,07380 
P-value 0,95622 0,38795 0,98211 0,71534 0,90297 0,94126 
 
As apparent from table 8, the number of deals with positive AAR and negative AAR 
respectively is fairly evenly distributed, where the number of positive deals sometimes 
exceeds negative and vice versa. As a conclusion no positive AAR was generated for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm over the event window.  
The t-test, which was performed to examine whether the result can be generalised, does not 
significantly differ from zero when looking at the p-values. This is true for each and every 
individual day as well as for the entire event window. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
for the event window at any significance level. Subsequently, it is not possible to statistically 
prove the existence of abnormal returns in connection to the announcement of an M&A 
transaction. The null hypotheses are accepted for AR and CAR. 
When comparing the entire sample to the two sub-samples, developed and developing 
countries, it is apparent that there were no noteworthy differences from the original. As with 
entire sample, no abnormal returns were observed for either sub-sample over the event period. 
The distribution of positive versus negative observations is fairly even for both sub-sample 
but for the developing there are higher fluctuations. CAAR for the event periods in the sub-
sample differs somewhat from the entire sample, in the developed sample the CAAR was -0,8 
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percent and -1,14 percent for the developing. Thus for the developing sample the value 
destruction observed around the transaction was marginally higher. The p-values showed that 
no observed days during the event window for the sub-samples were significant at any 
significance level. Therefore the null hypotheses are accepted for AR and CAR. The sub-
samples are displayed in table 9 and 10. 
Table 9 – Overview of event window for developed countries (87 observations) 
  T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 CAR 
AAR 0,297% 0,199% 
-
0,753% -0,015% -0,566%   
CAAR 0,297% 0,496% 
-
0,257% -0,272% -0,837%   
Number deals with positive abnormal 
returns 43 51 39 41 42   
Number deals with negative abnormal 
returns 44 36 48 46 45   
Average 0,00297 0,00199 
-
0,00753 
-
0,00015 
-
0,00566 -0,00809 
Standard deviation 0,01982 0,02273 0,04673 0,02535 0,02515 0,06714 
T-test 0,16600 0,31439 0,13558 0,86311 0,04646 0,22574 
P-value 0,86838 0,75366 0,89234 0,38946 0,96300 0,82171 
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Table 10 – Overview of event window developing countries (64 observations) 
  T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 CAR 
AAR 0,293% -0,253% 
-
1,103% -0,380% 0,043%   
CAAR 0,293% 0,039% 
-
1,063% -1,444% -1,401%   
Number deals with positive abnormal 
returns 42 23 29 32 39   
Number deals with negative abnormal 
returns 22 41 35 32 25   
Average 0,00293 
-
0,00253 
-
0,01103 
-
0,00380 0,00043 -0,01401 
Standard deviation 0,01734 0,02463 0,05018 0,02608 0,02101 0,07357 
T-test 0,18177 0,41368 0,08360 0,24683 0,89120 0,13260 
P-value 0,85601 0,67970 0,93349 0,80538 0,37425 0,89469 
 
Even though none of the samples show significance at a five-percent level, there is still 
enough standard deviation in the results in order to justify testing which variables influence 
CAAR. 
4.2.2 Analysis 
For all transactions the effect of M&A announcement, as mentioned, is not statistically 
significant. This means that when a UK firm announces an M&A transaction, no abnormal 
return is expected in the short term over the event window. If anything, the AAR is 
significantly negative around T0 for the entire sample. 
It is possible that the financial uncertainty in the economy could have had an impact on the 
stock price for examined time period. According to Schwert (1989), the volatility of the stock 
price is higher during a recession compared to periods of expansion. Even though the study is 
based upon US data, the authors cannot find any logical reasons as to why the UK market 
would behave differently. If the stock is very volatile there could be measurement 
implications when using the market model, which in turn might affect the results since a great 
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deal of observations is announced during periods of recession (e.g. Financial crisis 2008-
2009) (WorldBank, 2014). 
To relate to previous studies, Campa & Hernando (2004) and Andrade et al., (2001) all came 
to the conclusion that the abnormal returns were not significantly different from zero. A great 
deal of previous studies has shown that M&A transactions are value destroying for the 
acquiring firm. The studies are performed based on the US and European markets under 
similar circumstances in this study. 
In order to achieve reliability in the results in the study the requirement is that investors trade 
in a rational manner. Rationality in this case refers to the absence of bad investment or fails to 
realise investment opportunities. The fact that no abnormal returns were generated could 
indicate that that the existing shareholders retain their stock in the firm, whereas the market 
actively chooses not to invest. Alternatively, the positive and negative abnormal returns might 
cancel each other out. Malkiel (2003) refers to the human factor in his study. If investors trade 
on a random basis the effects of their actions will also cancel each other out. This assumption 
regarding positive and negative abnormal returns is further supported by the results illustrated 
in table 8, where the distribution of positive versus negative observations is fairly equal. 
According to Bieshaar, Knight & van Wassenaers (2001), around half of all the M&A 
transactions generate a negative return for the shareholders, which is in line with the 
distribution presented in this study. The randomness of the market could be a contributing 
factor as to why the authors did not find any significant abnormal returns over the event 
window.  
The efficiency of the UK stock market affects the extent to which the market reacts to new 
information. According to a study performed by Firth (1976), the UK stock market has shown 
to be semi-strong-form and this assumption is deemed to be reasonable for this study. For 
many of the individual firms there is a clear deviation in stock price upon the announcement 
of the transaction, which is an indication of a semi-strong-form market efficiency. Under the 
assumption that the market efficiency is semi-strong, the signalling theory can help to explain 
how the stock price reacts. The market interprets the signals that the management of a firm 
sends out through its communication and actions. Future expectations stems from the 
available information. At the time of the announcement of a potential transaction, the signals 
that are connected with the transaction are interpreted in relation to previous expectations.  If 
the deal signals positive future expectations and exceeds the investor requirements, the stock 
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price in theory should increase. If, however, the transaction is in line with the previous 
expectations, the reaction of the market should only be marginal. The results in this study 
implies that the contents of the signals in connection with the M&A deal, is already 
incorporated into the expectations since the majority of the transactions has relatively low or 
negative abnormal returns.  
The motives for M&A as discussed in the theoretical framework are varied and there are 
reasons for the management to engage in acquisitions regardless of whether or not the 
investors’ requirements are satisfied in the short-term. If the motive behind the transaction is 
not to create instant shareholder wealth, it could instead be a means to expand and grow or to 
realise synergy effects such as economies of scale. According to the efficient-market theory, 
only the immediate expectations of investors are reflected in the stock price. Expectations in 
regards to future synergy effects and cost reductions appear in the form of abnormal returns. 
Subsequently, different motives can be an explanation to whether abnormal returns are 
generated. Nevertheless, it is problematic to measure which motives affect the expectations. 
The results of this study have shown that in general the investor expectations regarding M&A 
transactions are fulfilled and that investors have confidence in the motives of the 
management. This is explained by the fact that AAR is close to zero. This assumption is in 
accordance with the study carried out by Guest et al., (2010). The transactions are therefore 
expected to satisfy expectations in future cash flows, as a result they should be correctly 
priced. The aforementioned reasoning is based upon the rational actions of the investors. With 
the modern technology at hand, such as the different advanced financial instruments, the 
availability of information is greater thus it decreased the uncertainty. This in turn should lead 
to investors responding faster to new information. Subsequently the market adjusts quicker 
which leads to increased efficiency. With reduced uncertainty, investors can calculate more 
accurate expectations, which in turn can be assumed to create less abnormal returns. 
Altogether this increases the means for investors to act more rationally. 
To summarize, the results point towards the fact that M&A transactions in general do not 
generate abnormal returns for the acquiring firm in the short term in the UK stock market. 
There are two main explanations for the results. Firstly, given that the UK market is 
characterised by a semi-strong efficiency and that investors act rationally, the low abnormal 
returns can be explained by the investors’ confidence in the management’s actions and 
motives to match their expectations. Secondly, the investors act randomly and their actions 
therefore cancel each other out.  
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4.3 Multiple Linear Regression Results and Analysis 
4.3.1 Entire Sample – CAR 5 
Table 11 – Multiple linear regression for entire data sample – CAR 5 
Dependent Variable: CAR_5   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 151   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CULT -0.032496 0.026188 -1.240845 0.2168 
EM_DV -8.192510 3.899279 -2.101032 0.0375 
EXC_RATE -1.018133 3.559296 -0.286049 0.7753 
EXP01 0.844660 1.545354 0.546580 0.5856 
GDP_G 0.079354 0.189608 0.418515 0.6762 
GEO -0.658520 1.970393 -0.334208 0.7387 
IND -0.044426 1.156845 -0.038402 0.9694 
INFL 0.066881 0.114312 0.585075 0.5595 
INT 0.172586 0.211900 0.814469 0.4168 
LANG -0.118007 1.791511 -0.065870 0.9476 
LN_GDP -0.958829 1.714280 -0.559319 0.5769 
LN_GDP_CAP -2.446582 3.214201 -0.761179 0.4479 
MOP -0.009496 1.366860 -0.006948 0.9945 
MTB -3.807318 1.154640 -3.297406 0.0012 
POL_STAB -1.538045 1.431624 -1.074336 0.2846 
SIZE -2.207867 1.462225 -1.509937 0.1334 
C 30.86907 28.77048 1.072943 0.2852 
     
     
R-squared 0.142917    Mean dependent var -1.066715 
Adjusted R-squared 0.040579    S.D. dependent var 6.918964 
S.E. of regression 6.777130    Akaike info criterion 6.770710 
Sum squared resid 6154.551    Schwarz criterion 7.110404 
Log likelihood -494.1886    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.908711 
F-statistic 1.396515    Durbin-Watson stat 1.828775 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.152474    Wald F-statistic 1.274536 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.222407    
     
     
 
The multiple linear regression for entire data sample with the event window CAR 5, displayed 
a determination coefficient (R-squared) of 0.1429 (table 11). This means that the variation in 
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abnormal returns as a result of the transaction is by 14.29 percent explained by the included 
independent explanatory and dummy variables. The R-square should ideally be as close to 
one as possible. One explanation to the relatively low R-square is the existence of noise in the 
model which is due to the fact that there are countless variables that affect M&A deals.  
The whole regression was significant at a very low level (20 percent), with a p-value of 
0.1525. In order to reject the null hypothesis, that all coefficients are equal to zero and 
subsequently do not have any explanatory value, the p-value should in academic research be 
at least less than 0.10. The p-value of the regression means that there is 15.25% risk that the 
assumption of the included variables does not hold. 
The control variables that had a significant coefficient were; market to book (1 percent level), 
emerging/developed (5 percent) and size was (15 percent). The remaining variables were not 
significant, which means that they can not be generalised with a linear relationship with CAR. 
In spite of this, the authors chose not to exclude the remaining variables from the regression 
model since a redundant test showed that the inclusion of the variables did not negatively 
impact the overall regression. None of the coefficients was worth interpreting further since the 
slopes of the coefficients with almost certainty would change if accounting for the omitted 
explanatory variables. This is due to the fact that assumption one and two for the OLS 
regression model were not satisfied, which means that the model is incorrectly specified since 
there were additional explanatory variables that were not included.  
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4.3.2 Entire Sample – CAR 11 
Table 12 – Multiple linear regression for entire data sample – CAR 11 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR_11  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 151   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CULT -0.009399 0.030517 -0.307987 0.7586 
EM_DV -6.205917 4.344688 -1.428392 0.1555 
EXC_RATE -0.693833 3.699067 -0.187570 0.8515 
EXP01 0.296361 1.599208 0.185317 0.8533 
GDP_G -0.013779 0.214927 -0.064109 0.9490 
GEO -0.242698 2.330938 -0.104120 0.9172 
IND -0.320846 1.345078 -0.238533 0.8118 
INFL 0.049381 0.124143 0.397777 0.6914 
INT 0.202231 0.248368 0.814241 0.4170 
LANG -0.095446 2.093475 -0.045592 0.9637 
LN_GDP -0.001649 1.779205 -0.000927 0.9993 
LN_GDP_CAP -0.906946 3.874184 -0.234100 0.8153 
MOP -0.235796 1.567947 -0.150385 0.8807 
MTB -2.400889 1.343979 -1.786403 0.0763 
POL_STAB -1.978379 1.637141 -1.208436 0.2290 
SIZE -1.199227 1.569532 -0.764066 0.4462 
C 12.35813 31.69117 0.389955 0.6972 
     
     
R-squared 0.071010    Mean dependent var -1.246775 
Adjusted R-squared -0.039914    S.D. dependent var 7.714710 
S.E. of regression 7.867166    Akaike info criterion 7.068998 
Sum squared resid 8293.568    Schwarz criterion 7.408692 
Log likelihood -516.7094    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.207000 
F-statistic 0.640169    Durbin-Watson stat 1.877170 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.846210    Wald F-statistic 0.620053 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.863347    
     
     
 
 
The multiple linear regression for entire data sample with the event window CAR 11, 
displayed a determination coefficient (R-squared) of 0.0710 (table 12). The whole regression 
was not significant at any significance level, with a p-value of 0.8462. Therefore for this event 
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window the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. As with the CAR 5 regression model, the 
dummy variable emerging/developed had a significant coefficient but at a much lower level of 
significance (20 percent). Furthermore, market to book was significant (10 percent). The 
remaining variables were not significant.  
Based on the results from the two regressions, CAR 5 better captured the effects of the 
independent variables displayed as the determination coefficient and its corresponding p-
value. As mentioned earlier, the authors concluded that the market responds to the 
announcement relatively quickly, thus the CAR 5 model is more appropriate and 
henceforward the only one examined.  
 
4.3.3 Regression results and analysis for sub samples 
The dummy variable emerging/developed (em_dv) took the value of one if the transaction 
took place in a developing country and zero otherwise. Since the variable was significant at a 
five percent level, there seemed to be a relationship between abnormal returns and target 
country. Therefore, the authors decided to split the entire sample into two sub samples, 
consisting of developing and developed countries respectively. A new regression was 
performed for with CAR 5 as dependent variable, for each sub sample, to investigate how the 
remaining variables were affected by the difference in target country.  
The tables are displayed on the following pages.
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Table 13 – Multiple linear regression for developing data sample – CAR 5 
 
Dependent Variable: EM_CAR_5  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 64   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
EM_CULT 0.007241 0.114683 0.063141 0.9499 
EM_EXC_RATE -1.108025 5.525542 -0.200528 0.8419 
EM_EXP -0.178473 2.511262 -0.071069 0.9436 
EM_GDP_G 0.191509 0.213453 0.897197 0.3741 
EM_GEO -4.044032 4.429852 -0.912905 0.3659 
EM_IND 0.975878 2.054192 0.475067 0.6369 
EM_INFL 0.213542 0.141330 1.510950 0.1374 
EM_INT -0.126536 0.272854 -0.463750 0.6449 
EM_LANG 0.513162 4.297090 0.119421 0.9054 
EM_LN_GDP 1.400276 5.924791 0.236342 0.8142 
EM_LN_GDP_CAP 1.861788 5.407980 0.344267 0.7321 
EM_MOP 0.038484 2.359428 0.016311 0.9871 
EM_MTB -3.223470 1.958815 -1.645622 0.1064 
EM_POL_STAB -2.664818 2.408683 -1.106338 0.2741 
EM_SIZE -6.038555 2.927742 -2.062530 0.0446 
C -17.66161 86.92145 -0.203190 0.8398 
     
     
R-squared 0.230917    Mean dependent var -1.213594 
Adjusted R-squared -0.009421    S.D. dependent var 7.101540 
S.E. of regression 7.134915    Akaike info criterion 6.980196 
Sum squared resid 2443.536    Schwarz criterion 7.519916 
Log likelihood -207.3663    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.192819 
F-statistic 0.960800    Durbin-Watson stat 1.739914 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.508351    Wald F-statistic 1.004167 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.466806    
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Table 14 – Multiple linear regression for developed data sample – CAR 5 
 
Dependent Variable: DV_CAR_5  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 87   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DV_CULT -0.021355 0.030892 -0.691258 0.4917 
DV_EXC_RATE 0.413314 5.103876 0.080980 0.9357 
DV_EXP 1.051011 1.745018 0.602293 0.5489 
DV_GDP_G 0.246980 0.319344 0.773397 0.4419 
DV_GEO 2.676147 2.567336 1.042383 0.3008 
DV_IND -2.498069 1.343571 -1.859276 0.0671 
DV_INFL 0.470105 0.691519 0.679816 0.4988 
DV_INT 0.932464 0.388484 2.400264 0.0190 
DV_LANG 0.553260 2.350863 0.235343 0.8146 
DV_LN_GDP 1.108443 1.908906 0.580669 0.5633 
DV_LN_GDP_CAP -18.52381 8.624257 -2.147873 0.0351 
DV_MOP -0.192056 1.601899 -0.119892 0.9049 
DV_MTB -4.824811 1.591586 -3.031449 0.0034 
DV_POL_STAB 0.423621 1.672831 0.253236 0.8008 
DV_SIZE 0.708626 1.611541 0.439720 0.6615 
C 69.67152 39.35338 1.770407 0.0810 
     
     
R-squared 0.275559    Mean dependent var -0.958667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.122508    S.D. dependent var 6.820971 
S.E. of regression 6.389514    Akaike info criterion 6.711781 
Sum squared resid 2898.638    Schwarz criterion 7.165282 
Log likelihood -275.9625    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.894392 
F-statistic 1.800438    Durbin-Watson stat 1.991613 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.051469    Wald F-statistic 1.464529 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.142659    
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The multiple linear regression for the developing sub sample showed a determination 
coefficient (R-squared) of 0.2309 (table 13) and 0.2756 for developed (table 14). These values 
were both higher compared to the entire sample (0.1429); consequently, the sub sample 
models are thus better at explaining the dependent variable. The regression for the developed 
sample was significant at a 10 percent level, with a p-value of 0.0515. Therefore, for this 
sample, the null hypothesis can be rejected. The same does not apply for the developing 
sample which had a p-value of 0.5084. 
When examining the individual variables for the developing sample, relative size proved to be 
significant at a 5 percent level. No further variables were significant for this sample. 
However, for the developed sample there were more variables that showed significance. 
Namely, industrial diversification (10 percent), GDP per capita (5 percent), market to book 
(0.1 percent) and interestingly enough, interest rate (2.5 percent).  
Firstly, it was worth noting that size did not have a significant impact in developing targets 
whereas in the developing countries there was a strong relationship between relative size of 
the deal and abnormal returns. In the developing sample, if the relative size of the deal to the 
market capitalisation of the acquiring firm is larger than ten percent then value was destroyed. 
Since acquisitions in general do not create value and in some cases destroys value for the 
shareholders, an explanation for the results might be size simply magnifies the extent to which 
value is destroyed.   
When UK firms acquired companies in developed countries there were more variables which 
significantly explained the abnormal returns. Industrial diversification seemed to destroy 
value, with a negative coefficient value (-2.4981). This means that firms, which acquire other 
firms in the same industries, destroy value. This is in accordance with industrial 
diversification theory (Kiymaz 2004), which states that diversification is expected to create 
value. GDP per capita was also significant, with a negative coefficient value of (-18.52). This 
implies that the purchasing power of an economy is not positively related to abnormal returns. 
Based on these results, acquiring firms cannot create value by simply purchasing firms in 
countries with large purchasing power per capita. Market to book is a proxy for performance 
previous to the transaction of M&A. In accordance to the theory  by Rau & Vermaelen 
(1998), our results showed that firms with high previous market to book values achieved less 
abnormal returns, in this case the coefficient value was negative (-4.8248). Finally, interest 
rates, which is a proxy for the cost of external capital, was significant with a positive 
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coefficient (0.9325). This means that the larger the difference in interest rates between target 
and acquirer country, the larger the positive wealth effects for the shareholders. This is 
supported by Uddin & Boateng (2010). 
To summarize, it is evident from the results that different variables affect the wealth effects 
for shareholders of UK acquiring firms depending on whether the target firm was from a 
developed or developing country.  
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4.4. Differences in Sub Samples 
Since the previous comparisons between developed and developing sub samples showed 
differences in which variables explained abnormal returns, another regression was constructed 
in order to further investigate these differences, as shown in table 15. 
 
Table 15 – Differences between developing and developed samples 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR_5   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 151   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CULT -0.021355 0.031437 -0.679291 0.4983 
EM_DV -87.33313 93.77637 -0.931291 0.3536 
EXC_RATE 0.413314 5.193793 0.079578 0.9367 
EXP01 1.051011 1.775760 0.591865 0.5551 
GDP_G 0.246980 0.324970 0.760008 0.4488 
GEO 2.676147 2.612566 1.024337 0.3078 
IND -2.498069 1.367241 -1.827088 0.0702 
INFL 0.470105 0.703701 0.668046 0.5054 
INT 0.932464 0.395328 2.358709 0.0200 
LANG 0.553260 2.392279 0.231269 0.8175 
LN_GDP 1.108443 1.942536 0.570617 0.5693 
LN_GDP_CAP -18.52381 8.776194 -2.110689 0.0369 
MOP -0.192056 1.630120 -0.117817 0.9064 
MTB -4.824811 1.619625 -2.978968 0.0035 
POL_STAB 0.423621 1.702302 0.248852 0.8039 
SIZE 0.708626 1.639932 0.432107 0.6664 
CULT*EM_DV 0.028596 0.116210 0.246068 0.8061 
EXC_RATE*EM_DV -1.521339 7.485442 -0.203240 0.8393 
EXP01*EM_DV -1.229484 3.025729 -0.406343 0.6852 
GDP_G*EM_DV -0.055471 0.385961 -0.143721 0.8860 
GEO*EM_DV -6.720179 5.049840 -1.330771 0.1858 
IND*EM_DV 3.473947 2.425935 1.432004 0.1548 
INFL*EM_DV -0.256563 0.717080 -0.357789 0.7211 
INT*EM_DV -1.059000 0.476588 -2.222044 0.0282 
LANG*EM_DV -0.040098 4.826569 -0.008308 0.9934 
LN_GDP*EM_DV 0.291833 6.097576 0.047860 0.9619 
LN_GDP_CAP*EM_DV 20.38560 10.23986 1.990809 0.0488 
MOP*EM_DV 0.230540 2.820497 0.081737 0.9350 
MTB*EM_DV 1.601341 2.504944 0.639272 0.5239 
POL_STAB*EM_DV -3.088438 2.901595 -1.064393 0.2893 
SIZE*EM_DV -6.747181 3.293459 -2.048661 0.0427 
C 69.67152 40.04669 1.739757 0.0845 
     
     R-squared 0.256049    Mean dependent var -1.066715 
Adjusted R-squared 0.062246    S.D. dependent var 6.918964 
S.E. of regression 6.700166    Akaike info criterion 6.827826 
Sum squared resid 5342.175    Schwarz criterion 7.467250 
Log likelihood -483.5009    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.087593 
F-statistic 1.321183    Durbin-Watson stat 1.726585 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.145789    Wald F-statistic 1.198242 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.242412    
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The test shows the differences in coefficient values between the two sub samples and whether 
or not they were statistically significant.  
As mentioned in our initial analysis of the entire sample, none of the explanatory variables 
were significant. However, when comparing each sample depending on target country, it was 
proven that interest rate and GDP per capita affected value creation only when acquiring in 
developed countries. The test in table 15 showed that these differences were both significant 
at 5 percent level. Further, the control variable size was also significantly different between 
the samples at a 5 percent level.  
 
4.5 Hypotheses findings 
The hypotheses from theoretical background indicate whether the explanatory variables have 
an impact on value creation for acquiring firms, i.e. a two-tailed hypothesis. The empirical 
research showed that these variables could impact value in one particular direction. Therefore, 
as described in chapter 3.8, the authors also created expected results for each variable based 
on these studies as displayed in table 16. 
Table 16 – Summary of expected results versus findings 
              
    Expected results Findings   
  Variable   Entire sample Developed Developing   
  CAAR 5 +/- - - -   
  LN_GDP + - + +   
  LN_GDP_CAP + - - +   
  GDP_G + + + +   
  INT + + + -   
  INFL - + + +   
  EXC_RATE - - + -   
  POL_STAB + - + -   
  CULT - - - +   
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4.5.1 Dependent variable 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) 
Literature is divided on whether Cumulative abnormal returns are generated in association 
with CBM&A deals for the acquiring firms. The results therefore are not in conflict with what 
is expected, that CAAR is negative over the event periods [-2,2 and -5,5]. CAAR is negative 
for all samples and event windows. However the results are not significant at any level. 
 
4.5.2 Independent variables 
Gross Domestic Product (LN_GDP) 
It was expected that the variable LN_GDP would have a positive impact on shareholder 
wealth. The reasoning is that large investments imply high risks, which can only be justified 
in a larger market. However, for the entire sample the findings for this variable showed a 
negative coefficient, meaning that the larger the economic size had a negative impact on 
wealth creation. According to the authors, one possible reason is the adoption of the wrong 
functional form, i.e. that there is no linear relationship between the abnormal returns and 
LN_GDP. This can potentially cause the coefficients to be biased enough to change the sign.  
This argument was supported from the RESET test as seen in appendix 2.1. For the sub 
samples the results were in accordance to what was expected. None of the coefficients were 
significant in any of the samples for this variable. 
The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between GDP and wealth effects in CBM&A transactions. 
 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita (LN_GDP_CAP) 
GDP per capital represents the purchasing power of the population. It was expected that the 
variable LN_GDP_CAP would have a positive impact on shareholder wealth. As with 
LN_GDP, the findings showed that the relationship was negative. One reasonable reason for 
this outcome could be multicollinearity, which causes inflated standard errors. This in in turn 
increases the likelihood to observe an incorrect sign. The variable LN_GDP_CAP is highly 
correlated with the dummy variable EM_DV with a value of (0.9). In the developing sample 
the sign was in accordance with what was expected, however this was not the case for the 
developed sample. Neither the entire sample nor the developing sample showed any 
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significance at any level for the variable. However, in the developed sample the variable was 
significant at a 5 percent level, which means that there seems to be a negative relationship 
between higher purchasing power and wealth effects. According to the authors there could be 
several explanations for the result. Firstly, there is a possibility that the variable is not a good 
proxy for purchasing power. The variable in question may be highly correlated with another 
variable which has been excluded from the regression. Since LN_GDP_CAP only measures 
the total GDP per Capita for each country there are limitations because the variable does not 
include information regarding the general price levels of that country. Secondly, the market 
could react negatively in connection with transactions in countries with high GDP per capita 
since it is likely that these countries will also have higher cost of labour, thus any acquisition 
might increase the costs for the acquirer beyond what is initially expected.  
The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between GDP per capita and wealth effects in CBM&A 
transactions. 
 
Gross Domestic Product Annual Growth (GDP_G) 
GDP_G is a proxy for the future economic prosperity of a country. It was therefore expected 
have a positive relationship with wealth effects since economies with higher growth are 
considered to be in the ascendancy, which is often followed, by an increased purchasing 
power and ultimately a higher demand for products. The results show that the findings are in 
accordance with expected results for all three different samples. However, none of the results 
were significant at any level. 
The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between GDP growth and wealth effects in CBM&A transactions. 
 
Interest Rate (INT) 
Interest rates were used as a proxy for the target country’s cost of external capital. It is 
expected that the larger the difference in interest rate between target and acquirer country, the 
larger the positive wealth effects for shareholders. The findings are in agreement with the 
expected outcome for all of the samples. There is no significance for the entire or the 
developing sample at any significance level. Nevertheless, the findings are significant at 2.5 
percent level for the developed sample. This means that there is a significant positive relation 
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between interest rates and wealth creation. The possibility to gain financial synergy through 
access to external funds at a lower cost of capital in the acquirer country and the fact that 
competitors in the target country have to use more expensive ways of raising capital seems to 
increase wealth creation for the acquirer. 
The null hypothesis can however not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between interest rate and wealth effects in CBM&A transactions. 
 
Inflation (INFL) 
The variable inflation is proxy for the economic condition of a country. It is expected that 
inflation in the target country is negatively correlated with shareholder wealth. However, the 
findings are different from the expected results in all three samples. After excluding reasons 
such as multicollinearity, the most likely explanation to the difference in signs is either due to 
the non-linear relationship or an insufficient number of observations in the sample. None of 
the coefficients for the three samples however are significant. 
The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between inflation and wealth effects in CBM&A transactions. 
 
Exchange Rate (EXC_RATE) 
The variable exchange rate signifies the relative strength or weakness of the acquiring versus 
the target currency. It is expected that the acquirers would benefit from a strong home 
currency at the time of the transaction and thus be positively related to shareholder wealth. 
The hypothesis was created in such a way that a negative coefficient value indicated a positive 
shareholder wealth creation. The expected results are in accordance to the findings for the 
entire sample as well as for the developing countries. However, for the developed sample the 
opposite is true. This could be due to an insufficient number of observations or, as according 
to the theory, that the overall impact the exchange rate has on the acquirer is still relatively 
unknown since expected future cash flows is a function of future exchange rates. None of the 
coefficients for the samples are significant.  
The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between exchange rate and wealth effects in CBM&A transactions. 
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Political Stability (POL_STAB) 
The variable Political Stability is a proxy for numerous risks, such as internal and external 
conflicts, regime discontinuity and changes in the legal. It is expected that there is a positive 
correlation between political stability and wealth effects for shareholders. When comparing 
the expected results to the findings it is evident that this is only true for the developed sample. 
The authors believe that there are not enough observations for the developing sample which 
has caused the coefficients to be biased. This in turn has influenced the entire sample’s 
coefficients and the coefficients for the developed sample are in accordance with what was 
expected. However, none of the samples are significant at any level. 
The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between political stability and wealth effects in CBM&A 
transactions. 
 
Culture (CULT) 
The variable culture signifies cultural differences between the acquiring and target country. It 
was expected that there was a negative relationship between cultural difference and wealth 
effects for shareholders. The coefficients in the findings show the same outcome as was 
expected in all samples apart from the developing sample. This is more likely than not to 
again be due to the small number of observations. None of the samples were significant at any 
level. 
The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected for the entire sample, meaning that there is 
no significant relationship between Culture and wealth effects in CBM&A transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This final chapter begins by linking the purpose, result and analysis of the thesis together to 
draw relevant conclusions. Thereafter, the authors present their research contributions, the 
practical applications of the conclusions and the limitations of the results. Finally, further 
areas of research are suggested. 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the short-term effects on stock price for UK 
acquiring firms in conjunction with the announcement of a CBM&A transaction. Moreover, 
the thesis intended to investigate whether these effects can be explained by the 
macroeconomic conditions in the target countries and whether they were any differences 
between these factors depending on stage of the development in target country. 
Based on the results it can be concluded that the average UK CBM&A transaction for the 
period 1997-2012 does not yield any abnormal returns for neither of the event windows 
(CAR5, CAR11). Since the observed abnormal returns generally fall within an interval close 
to zero, the authors can conclude that the results can be applicable to the entire UK CBM&A 
market. The answer to the overall issue, identified in the problem definition, is that CBM&A 
transactions are not expected to generate abnormal returns in the short-term for UK acquiring 
companies. On the contrary, if anything, the stock price reaction indicates such transactions to 
be value destroying.  
In accordance with previous studies mentioned in the theoretical background, the 
circumstances regarding market responses to CBM&A is similar to the results of this study. 
The authors reasoning for the outcome is that investors might act rationally or irrationally. 
The latter means that the individual actions of each investor cancel each other out in the form 
of a zero-sum game. The lack of abnormal returns can also depend on the availability of 
information or the markets confidence in the management of the acquiring firm. Modern 
analytical tools and technology, enhances the opportunity for individual investors to 
determine the future expected value of the transaction, thus to create more accurate expected 
returns. The future synergy effects can, in accordance with, the efficient-market hypothesis, 
be included in the stock price and only the unforeseen component of a transaction reflects the 
 
 
81 
 
abnormal returns. Subsequently, the results of the study can be explained by the fact that on 
the whole investors have correctly assessed their expectations regarding the CBM&A deal.  
According to the signalling theory mentioned in chapter 2.2.2, it is essential for the 
management to accurately communicate the information regarding the transaction, in order 
for the market to correctly value the potential future returns and generate adequate 
expectations. The authors argue that short-term abnormal returns arise as a direct consequence 
of alterations in expectations, which in this case stems from the publication of 
announcements. With the results in this thesis in mind, it seems like corporate managers in 
UK based firms communicate both sufficient and trustworthy information. This in turn 
supports investors when creating forecasting for expected returns. As a consequence, this 
would explain the fact that on average there are no abnormal returns in connection with 
CBM&A transactions.  
The conclusion from the regression analysis for the entire sample surprisingly showed that 
none of the macroeconomic and cultural variables explained at a significant level the variation 
in abnormal returns. There is a great deal of theoretical evidence that these factors have an 
impact on wealth creation, however, for this study these hypotheses could not be accepted. As 
mentioned in the analysis, there are many possible explanations for the contradictory results 
and the authors believe the main underlying reason for this to be due to the relatively small 
sample size.  
Of the control variables included in the regression, relative size of the deal in comparison to 
the market capitalization of the acquiring firm, showed to have a negative impact on wealth 
creation. However, this result is not in accordance previous empirical studies, which state that 
the larger size deal is to generate higher abnormal returns. The authors believe that there 
should not be a theoretical explanation for this discrepancy. It is most likely due to the fact 
that the acquiring firms included in the sample were too large and the targets too small. The 
market to book dummy variable, however, showed that firms with high previous market to 
book values achieved less abnormal returns, which is in accordance with previous theory. 
However, the fact that developing/developed (EM_DV) dummy variable was highly 
significant showed that choice of target country played a noteworthy role in CBM&A 
transactions. When comparing the developed to the developing samples, it was apparent that 
interest rates and GDP per capita are statistically significantly different. These two variables 
have an impact when engaging in CBM&A in developed countries. For GDP per capita, there 
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seems to be a negative relationship between higher purchasing power and wealth effects, 
which contradicts previous empirical theory. The discrepancy has previously been mentioned 
by the authors in the analysis. In regards to interest rate the results points towards a positive 
relation between interest rates and abnormal returns and this is in line with past research. 
The authors realize that stock price changes are dependent on a set of very complex 
circumstances. The results should therefore be interpreted as part of a wider perspective; 
however, based on the outcome of the study, the authors can conclude that interest rate and 
GPD per capital play a significant when engaging in CBM&A transactions in developed 
countries. 
 
5.2 Research contribution and practical application 
The authors have contributed to existing research in several ways. Firstly, by demonstrating 
that regardless of whether the target company domiciles in a developed or developing 
country, the abnormal returns for the acquiring firm in the short-term are on average close to 
zero. Secondly, the macroeconomic and cultural factors in the target countries do not seem to 
explain much variation in abnormal returns. In simple terms, this means that there are no 
significant relationships between shareholder wealth and macroeconomic & cultural factors. 
Finally, in spite of aforementioned results, it is evident that, different variables affect the 
wealth effects for shareholders of the acquiring firms differently, depending on whether the 
target firm was from a developed or developing country.  
Since the results of the thesis indicate that on average there are no abnormal returns, the 
practical application is that corporate managers must always carefully consider the valuation 
of the target. There are many potential value-creating components associated with CBM&A 
deals, such as synergy effects, but these must not be exceeded by the transaction premium so 
that shareholder value is not destroyed in the short-term. For each and every cross-border 
transaction, the corporate managers should be aware of the development stage of target 
country since the macroeconomic factors have shown to affect wealth creation differently in 
developing and developed countries. 
However, there are limitations in the study which must be emphasized. The wealth effects of 
CBM&A are usually accumulated over a longer time period, which is why it can be 
misleading to only measure in the short-term. This study investigated the effects during a 5-
day and 11-day event window, however, the market may not respond within these time frames 
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resulting in omitted outcomes. Furthermore, the possibility to draw definite conclusions based 
on the results is limited since most of the explanatory coefficients are not significant. Another 
obvious limitation is that the study was restricted to only investigating UK acquiring firms, 
hence the findings might not be generalizable for acquirers in other nations.  
 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
The conclusions drawn from the results of the study have opened up for range of new 
potential questions and different approaches that can be carried out. 
 One suggestion is to replicate the study for more than one acquiring country and then 
comparing the results. Thereafter comparisons can be made to investigate whether the 
various markets react differently to CBM&A announcements and what the underlying 
causes of this would be.  
 
 It would be interesting to examine and test more explanatory variables. These could 
possibly not only be limited to macroeconomic factors. Suggestive examples could 
include: cost of labour, bargaining power of acquirer, previous performance of target, 
difference between tax systems, human capital, and level of domestic technology. 
Political stability could also be divided into further sub categories such government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law or control of corruption. 
 
 It can be justifiable to include results from various statistical and economical models 
in order to examine whether the market model used in this study, is the most 
appropriate for investigating abnormal returns. Furthermore, it can be interesting to 
examine the long-term shareholder effects for CBM&A transactions.  
 
 Finally, a qualitative approach can be included as a compliment to investigate the 
extent to which for example, corporate managers take macroeconomic factors into 
account when pursuing CBM&A deals and compare managers’ stance to numerical 
evidence. 
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APPENDIX 1a – Deal information for entire data sample: Deals 1-31 
Deal Acquirer name Index Date of deal Target name Target 
number          country code 
1 3I GROUP PLC FTSE 250 03-02-2000 TH TECHNOLOGIEHOLDING GMBH DE 
2 ACM SHIPPING GROUP PLC FTSE All-Share 24-06-2010 ENDEAVOUR SHIPBROKERS PTY LTD'S BUSINESS AU 
3 AGGREKO PLC FTSE 100 26-03-2012 COMPANHIA BRASILEIRA DE LOCA«’ES BR 
4 AMEC PLC FTSE 250 07-02-2011 ZEKTINGROUP AU 
5 AMLIN PLC FTSE 250 03-06-2009 FORTIS CORPORATE INSURANCE NV NL 
6 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC FTSE 100 21-07-2000 NORTH LTD AU 
7 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC FTSE 100 31-03-2008 IRONX MINERA«√O SA BR 
8 ANGLO-EASTERN PLANTATIONS PLC FTSE Small Cap 18-03-2004 BINA PITRI JAYA PT ID 
9 ANITE GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 08-07-1998 HOUDSTERMAATSCHAPPIJ BV NL 
10 ARM HOLDINGS PLC FTSE 100 23-06-2006 FALANX MICROSYSTEMS AS NO 
11 ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS PLC FTSE 100 09-03-2004 UNILEVER GROUP'S MEXICO MX 
12 ASTRAZENECA PLC FTSE 100 09-12-1998 ASTRA AB SE 
13 ASTRAZENECA PLC FTSE 100 23-04-2007 MEDIMMUNE INC. US 
14 AVEVA GROUP PLC FTSE 250 21-04-2004 TRIBON SOLUTIONS AB SE 
15 AVIVA PLC FTSE 100 04-01-2008 LIG INSURANCE CO., LTD KR 
16 AVOCET MINING PLC FTSE All-Share 19-05-2009 WEGA MINING ASA NO 
17 BALFOUR BEATTY PLC FTSE 250 20-06-2008 SCHRECK-MIEVES GMBH DE 
18 BARCLAYS PLC FTSE 100 25-04-2005 ABSA GROUP LTD ZA 
19 BG GROUP PLC FTSE 100 14-04-1999 COMPANHIA DE G¡S DE S√O PAULO BR 
20 BG GROUP PLC FTSE 100 03-10-2001 ENRON OIL & GAS INDIA LTD IN 
21 BILLITON PLC FTSE 100 29-08-2000 WORSLEY ALUMINA PTY LTD AU 
22 BODYCOTE  PLC FTSE 250 14-12-2000 LINDBERG CORPORATION US 
23 BODYCOTE  PLC FTSE 250 03-11-2006 BRASIMET COMERCIO E INDUSTRIA S.A. BR 
24 BP PLC FTSE 100 11-03-2011 DEVON ENERGY DO BRASIL LTDA BR 
25 BRADY PLC FTSE All-Share 29-11-2010 VIZ RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES AS NO 
26 BRADY PLC FTSE All-Share 07-02-2012 NAVITA SYSTEMS AS NO 
27 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC FTSE 100 11-01-1999 ROTHMANS INTERNATIONAL SA CH 
28 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC FTSE 100 22-02-2008 TEKEL AS GENEL CIGARETTE BUSINESS TR 
29 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC FTSE 100 17-06-2009 BENTOEL INTERNASIONAL INVESTAMA TBK ID 
30 BRITVIC PLC FTSE 250 14-05-2007 C&C GROUP PLC'S SOFT DRINKS DIVISION  IE 
31 BUNZL PLC FTSE 100 09-02-2004 SKIFFY GROUP NL 
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APPENDIX 1a – Deal information for entire data sample: Deals 32-61 
Deal Acquirer name Index Date of deal Target name Target 
number          country code 
32 CAIRN ENERGY PLC FTSE 250 03-04-2012 AGORA OIL & GAS AS NO 
33 CALEDONIA INVESTMENTS PLC FTSE 250 01-12-2010 DEUTSCHE POSTBANK HOME FINANCE LTD IN 
34 CENTRICA PLC FTSE 100 06-06-2005 OXXIO NEDERLAND BV NL 
35 CENTRICA PLC FTSE 100 21-11-2011 STATOIL PETROLEUM AS NO 
36 CEB RESOURCES PLC FTSE All-Share 09-04-2008 TEMPLE CAPITAL PARTNERS LTDA BR 
37 COBHAM PLC FTSE 250 07-02-2001 OMNIPLESS (PROPRIETARY) LTD ZA 
38 COBHAM PLC FTSE 250 28-05-2003 NORTHROP GRUMMAN US 
39 COMPUTACENTER PLC FTSE 250 21-07-2011 DAMAX AG CH 
40 DECHRA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC FTSE 250 05-04-2012 EUROVET ANIMAL HEALTH BV NL 
41 DIAGEO PLC FTSE 100 06-06-2005 MONTANA WINES LTD NZ 
42 DIAGEO PLC FTSE 100 21-02-2011 MEY I«KI SAN VE TIC AS TR 
43 DIXONS GROUP PLC FTSE 250 29-11-1999 ELKJÿP NORGE AS NO 
44 DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES PLC FTSE 250 11-07-2005 CITRONIX LP US 
45 DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES PLC FTSE 250 06-06-2012 GRAPH-TECH AG CH 
46 EASYJET PLC FTSE 100 08-05-2002 DEUTSCHE BA LUFTFAHRT GMBH DE 
47 ELEMENTIS PLC FTSE 250 22-04-2004 SASOL SERVO BV NL 
48 ERINACEOUS GROUP PLC FTSE All-Share 13-02-2006 TOM MCNAMARA & PARTNERS LTD IE 
49 FIRSTGROUP PLC FTSE 250 08-11-2003 AIRCOACH LTD IE 
50 FORTUNE OIL PLC FTSE All-Share 31-03-2008 XINYANG CITY GAS COMPANY CN 
51 GALLEON HOLDINGS PLC FTSE All-Share 20-02-2008 MENGBO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD CN 
52 GENEL ENERGY PLC FTSE All-Share 14-05-2012 A & T PETROLEUM CO LTD TR 
53 GKN PLC FTSE 100 06-08-2000 NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD JP 
54 GKN PLC FTSE 100 31-03-2004 TOCHIGI FUJI INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD JP 
55 GKN PLC FTSE 100 04-08-2004 VELCON SA DE CV MX 
56 GKN PLC FTSE 100 28-07-2011 GETRAG ALL WHEEL DRIVE AB SE 
57 GKN PLC FTSE 100 05-07-2012 VOLVO AERO AB SE 
58 GREENKO GROUP PLC FTSE All-Share 09-11-2010 HEMAVATHI POWER & LIGHT PVT LTD IN 
59 HALMA PLC FTSE 250 08-03-2011 MEDICEL AG CH 
60 HAYS PLC FTSE 250 04-01-1997 DAUFENBACH GMBH DE 
61 HIGHLAND GOLD MINING LTD FTSE All-Share 01-06-2012 KLEN OOO RU 
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APPENDIX 1a – Deal information for entire data sample: Deals 62-91 
Deal Acquirer name Index Date of deal Target name Target 
number          country code 
62 HIRCO PLC FTSE Small Cap 18-12-2008 HIRCO DEVELOPMENTS PVT LTD IN 
63 HORIZONTE MINERALS PLC FTSE All-Share 27-07-2010 TECK COMINCO BRASIL SA BR 
64 HUNTING PLC FTSE 250 08-06-2009 SMB INDUSTRI, PT ID 
65 HYDER CONSULTING PLC FTSE Small Cap 26-11-2007 VOIGT INGENIEURE GMBH BERLIN DE 
66 IG GROUP HOLDINGS PLC FTSE 250 24-09-2008 FXONLINE JAPAN CO., LTD JP 
67 IMI PLC FTSE 100 04-04-1997 TA HYDRONICS SE 
68 IMI PLC FTSE 100 11-01-2001 BTG'S SEVERE SERVICE VALVES BUSINESS SE 
69 IMI PLC FTSE 100 03-10-2005 ABB KK'S CONTROL VALVES BUSINESS JP 
70 IMI PLC FTSE 100 09-08-2007 PNEUMATEX AG CH 
71 IMI PLC FTSE 100 25-10-2010 ZIMMERMANN & JANSEN MBH DE 
72 IMI PLC FTSE 100 17-02-2012 GRUPO INTERATIVA EMPRESARIAL LTDA BR 
73 INCHCAPE PLC FTSE 250 30-08-2006 AXEL CAR OOO RU 
74 INCHCAPE PLC FTSE 250 04-10-2007 ORGTEKHSTROI OOO RU 
75 INCHCAPE PLC FTSE 250 24-04-2008 MUSA MOTORS RU 
76 INFORMA PLC FTSE 250 07-06-2011 BRAZIL TRADE SHOWS PARTNERS BR 
77 INNOVATION GROUP PLC, THE FTSE Small Cap 25-10-2006 SUREPLAN INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD AU 
78 ITE GROUP PLC FTSE 250 28-04-2008 SIBIRSKAYA YARMARKA VTS OOO RU 
79 ITE GROUP PLC FTSE 250 17-12-2010 MEZHDUNARODNAYA VYSTAVOCHNAYA ZAO RU 
80 ITE GROUP PLC FTSE 250 03-03-2011 VYSTAVOCHNYI TSENTR KRASNODAREKSPO  RU 
81 JAMES FISHER AND SONS PLC FTSE 250 16-12-2002 SCAN TECH HOLDING A/S NO 
82 JKX OIL & GAS PLC FTSE Small Cap 24-07-2007 YUZHGAZENERDZHI OOO RU 
83 JOHN MENZIES PLC FTSE Small Cap 31-03-2008 NOVIA SVERIGE AB SE 
84 JOHNSTON PRESS PLC FTSE Small Cap 18-09-2005 LEINSTER LEADER LTD, THE IE 
85 KENTZ CORPORATION LTD FTSE 250 08-02-2011 RNE ENGINEERING AND PROJECTS (PTY) LTD ZA 
86 KINGFISHER PLC FTSE 100 27-04-2005 OBI ASIA HOLDING LTD CN 
87 LONMIN PLC FTSE 250 31-05-2001 PLATINUM AUSTRALIA LTD AU 
88 LOW & BONAR PLC FTSE Small Cap 07-07-2006 COLBOND INVESTMENTS BV NL 
89 MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 29-05-2001 CZIPIN & PARTNER GMBH DE 
90 MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 19-09-2007 KURT SALMON ASSOCIATES INC. US 
91 MECOM GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 05-04-2006 MEDIA GROEP LIMBURG BV NL 
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APPENDIX 1a – Deal information for entire data sample: Deals 92-121 
Deal Acquirer name Index Date of deal Target name Target 
number          country code 
92 MECOM GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 25-07-2006 ORKLA MEDIA AS NO 
93 MEGGITT PLC FTSE 100 20-08-1998 VIBRO-METER SA CH 
94 MILLENNIUM & COPTHORNE HOTELS PLC FTSE 250 22-04-1999 CDL ASIAN AND AUSTRALIAN HOTEL OPERATIONS AU 
95 MILLENNIUM & COPTHORNE HOTELS PLC FTSE 250 02-09-1999 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD US 
96 NORTHBRIDGE INDUSTRIAL SERVICES PLC FTSE All-Share 30-06-2010 TASMAN OIL TOOLS PTY LTD AU 
97 OLD MUTUAL PLC FTSE 100 02-09-2005 FÖRSÄKRINGSAKTIEBOLAGET SKANDIA AB SE 
98 PAN AFRICAN RESOURCES PLC FTSE All-Share 20-12-2006 BARBERTON MINES (PTY) LTD ZA 
99 PAN AFRICAN RESOURCES PLC FTSE All-Share 21-05-2009 PHOENIX PLATINUM (PTY) LTD ZA 
100 PAN AFRICAN RESOURCES PLC FTSE All-Share 30-01-2012 EVANDER GOLD MINES LTD ZA 
101 PEARSON PLC FTSE 100 15-04-2009 WALL STREET ENGLISH CN 
102 PEARSON PLC FTSE 100 22-07-2010 SEB - SISTEMA EDUCACIONAL BRASILEIRO BR 
103 PERFORM GROUP PLC FTSE 250 16-05-2012 RUNNINGBALL HOLDING AG CH 
104 PERFORM GROUP PLC FTSE 250 29-06-2012 MACKOLIK INTERNET HIZMETLERI TIC AS TR 
105 POWERHOUSE ENERGY GROUP PLC FTSE All-Share 30-12-2011 PYROMEX HOLDING AG CH 
106 PROSPECT JAPAN FUND LTD, THE FTSE All-Share 15-07-2011 INVINCIBLE INVESTMENT CORPORATION JP 
107 PROTEOME SCIENCES PLC FTSE All-Share 31-05-2002 XZILLION PROTEOMICS GMBH & CO. KG DE 
108 PZ CUSSONS PLC FTSE 250 05-01-2012 SABRE GROUP LTD'S FUDGE HAIR CARE AU 
109 RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP PLC FTSE 100 13-12-2010 PARAS PHARMACEUTICALS LTD IN 
110 RENOLD PLC FTSE Small Cap 09-06-2008 LG BALAKRISHNAN & BROS LTD IN 
111 RENTOKIL INITIAL PLC FTSE 250 25-09-2012 WESTERN EXTERMINATOR COMPANY US 
112 REXAM PLC FTSE 100 30-11-1998 PLM AB SE 
113 REXAM PLC FTSE 100 31-10-2003 LATAS DE ALUMINIO SA BR 
114 REXAM PLC FTSE 100 25-01-2006 FANGXIN LTD`S BEAUTY BUSINESS CN 
115 REXAM PLC FTSE 100 04-07-2007 ROSTAR OOO RU 
116 ROTORK PLC FTSE 250 30-01-2008 REMOTE CONTROLS SWEDEN AB SE 
117 RSA INSURANCE GROUP PLC FTSE 100 07-03-1998 NORWICH UNION'S NEW ZEALAND NZ 
118 ROYAL BANK of SCOTLAND PLC FTSE 100 06-10-2003 FIRST ACTIVE PLC IE 
119 RPS GROUP PLC FTSE 250 08-02-2000 EEL GROUP IE 
120 RPS GROUP PLC FTSE 250 01-07-2009 CONICS PTY LTD AU 
121 SAGE GROUP PLC, THE FTSE 100 28-02-1997 KHK SOFTWARE AG DE 
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APPENDIX 1a – Deal information for entire data sample: Deals 122-151 
Deal Acquirer name Index Date of deal Target name Target 
number          country code 
122 SAGE GROUP PLC, THE FTSE 100 01-08-2003 SOFTLINE LTD ZA 
123 SAGE GROUP PLC, THE FTSE 100 04-04-2006 VISMA ASA NO 
124 SSE PLC FTSE 100 04-01-2008 AIRTRICITY HOLDINGS LTD IE 
125 SENIOR PLC FTSE 250 11-05-1998 DELTATERM INDUSTRIA E COMERCIO LTDA BR 
126 SERCO PLC FTSE 250 31-05-2011 INTELENET GLOBAL SERVICES PVT LTD IN 
127 SHANKS GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 26-01-2000 WASTE MANAGEMENT NEDERLAND BV NL 
128 SMITH & NEPHEW PLC FTSE 100 12-03-2007 PLUS ORTHOPEDICS HOLDING AG CH 
129 SOUND OIL PLC FTSE All-Share 26-06-2006 MITRA ENERGIA LTD ID 
130 SPIRAX-SARCO ENGINEERING PLC FTSE 250 25-05-2010 SPIRAX-SARCO MEXICANA SA MX 
131 SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS PLC FTSE 250 20-04-2012 MU DYNAMICS INC. US 
132 STANDARD CHARTERED PLC FTSE 100 22-04-1999 BANK BALI TBK, PT ID 
133 STANDARD CHARTERED PLC FTSE 100 10-01-2005 KOREA FIRST BANK KR 
134 STATPRO GROUP PLC FTSE All-Share 09-05-2006 KIZEN (PTY) LTD ZA 
135 STERLING ENERGY PLC FTSE All-Share 19-01-2007 WHITTIER ENERGY COMPANY US 
136 SYNERGY HEALTH PLC FTSE 250 19-03-2012 LEONI STUDER HARD AG CH 
137 TARSUS GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 19-05-2011 IFO ISTANBUL FUAR HIZMETLERI AS TR 
138 TARSUS GROUP PLC FTSE Small Cap 20-03-2012 LIFE MEDIA FUARCILIK AS TR 
139 TELECITY GROUP PLC FTSE 250 05-08-2011 DATA ELECTRONICS GROUP LTD IE 
140 TESCO PLC FTSE 100 27-02-2003 KIPA KITLE PAZARLAMA TICARET VE GIDA SANAYI AS TR 
141 THOMAS COOK GROUP PLC FTSE 250 07-03-2008 THOMAS COOK (INDIA) LTD IN 
142 TULLETT PREBON PLC FTSE 250 13-10-2009 CONVENCÃO SA CORRETORA DE VALORES E C¬MBIO BR 
143 TULLOW OIL PLC FTSE 100 04-05-2004 ENERGY AFRICA LTD ZA 
144 TULLOW OIL PLC FTSE 100 23-05-2011 NUON EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION BV NL 
145 UTV MEDIA PLC FTSE Small Cap 18-12-2007 CAPITAL RADIO PRODUCTIONS LTD IE 
146 WEIR GROUP PLC, THE FTSE 100 04-12-2007 CH WARMAN PUMP GROUP ZA 
147 VITEC GROUP PLC, THE FTSE Small Cap 14-02-1997 ANTON/BAUER INC. US 
148 VODAFONE GROUP PLC FTSE 100 13-11-1999 MANNESMANN AG DE 
149 VODAFONE GROUP PLC FTSE 100 21-12-2000 EIRCELL LTD IE 
150 VODAFONE GROUP PLC FTSE 100 13-12-2005 TELSIM MOBIL TELEKOMUNIKASYON HIZMETLERI AS TR 
151 VODAFONE GROUP PLC FTSE 100 11-02-2007 HUTCHISON ESSAR TELECOM LTD IN 
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APPENDIX 1b – Variable information for entire data sample: Deals 1-31 
 Deal 
CAR 11 CAR 5 GDP  GDP/ GDP INT INFL EXC POL CULT IND MoP MTB EXP GEO LANG SIZE EM/DV 
number       CAP g     RATE STAB                   
1 -0,1828 0,0002 12,4159 4,5016 1,87 -0,74 0,57 -0,156 3,67 52 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
2 -0,0281 -0,0367 11,8935 4,5554 1,65 4,25 1,82 0,21 3,33 23 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
3 0,0168 0,0072 12,0518 3,7575 2,73 6,75 6,64 0,142 2,37 143 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
4 0,0262 0,0274 11,9025 4,5587 2,09 3,8 2,85 0,332 3,37 23 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
5 0,1101 0,0627 11,8279 4,6281 1,80 3,19 2,49 0,252 3,36 82 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
6 -0,0248 0,0641 11,7552 4,4781 4,95 0,25 1,47 -0,083 3,51 23 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
7 0,0488 0,0666 11,9881 3,7094 6,10 11,75 3,64 -0,049 2,12 143 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
8 -0,1227 -0,0681 11,4108 3,0719 4,78 2,68 6,59 -0,058 0,38 151 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
9 -0,1664 -0,1465 11,7233 4,5299 4,28 -1,62 2,18 -0,091 3,94 82 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
10 0,0418 -0,0158 11,4830 4,8180 2,59 0,5 1,52 -0,035 3,78 97 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
11 -0,0561 -0,0567 11,9084 3,8747 1,42 4,79 4,55 -0,105 2,36 155 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
12 -0,0742 -0,0790 11,4546 4,5079 2,71 -2,06 0,52 -0,031 3,88 89 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
13 0,0226 0,0410 13,1285 4,6538 2,67 -1,17 3,23 -0,174 2,99 22 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
14 -0,0203 0,0138 11,5374 4,5851 2,34 -2,64 1,93 -0,017 3,82 89 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
15 -0,0053 0,0387 11,9703 4,2837 5,11 1 2,53 0,018 3,03 173 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
16 -0,0433 -0,0026 11,5045 4,8261 0,07 1,25 3,77 0,104 3,75 97 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
17 -0,0091 0,0030 12,4716 4,5564 3,27 1,98 2,3 0,016 3,49 52 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
18 0,0205 0,0161 11,3705 3,7015 4,55 2,5 1,39 0,09 2,38 55 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
19 -0,0150 0,0220 11,8665 3,6374 0,04 13,5 3,2 0,405 2,13 143 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
20 -0,0865 -0,0284 11,8005 2,7619 3,84 8,08 4,01 0,072 1,51 98 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
21 -0,0073 0,1414 11,7552 4,4781 4,95 0,25 1,47 -0,083 3,51 23 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
22 -0,0307 0,0000 13,0455 4,5998 4,85 8,25 2,19 0,026 2,27 22 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
23 -0,2425 -0,0513 11,9456 3,6757 3,16 0,5 6,87 -0,187 3,32 143 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
24 0,0079 0,0443 12,0401 3,7496 7,53 10,5 5,04 0,243 2,51 143 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
25 -0,0105 -0,0456 11,4973 4,8135 -1,63 1,5 2,17 0,169 3,74 97 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
26 -0,0150 0,0038 11,5052 4,8098 1,34 1 1,3 0,174 3,83 97 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
27 -0,2054 -0,2553 11,5353 4,6834 2,73 -5 0,02 -0,094 3,86 49 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
28 -0,0415 -0,0368 11,7327 3,8908 4,67 6 8,76 -0,198 1,41 154 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
29 -0,0224 -0,0298 11,5315 3,1620 6,01 13,63 9,78 -0,1 1,68 151 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
30 -0,0427 -0,0770 11,3299 4,7007 5,51 -1,19 3,94 -0,073 3,64 28 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
31 -0,0271 -0,0197 11,7867 4,5765 0,34 -0,66 2,11 -0,026 3,64 82 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX 1b – Variable information for entire data sample: Deal 32-61 
 
Deal CAR 11 CAR 5 GDP  GDP/ GDP INT INFL EXC POL CULT IND MoP MTB EXP GEO LANG SIZE EM/DV 
number       CAP g     RATE STAB                   
32 -0,0332 -0,0418 11,5052 4,8098 1,34 1 1,3 0,174 3,83 97 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
33 -0,0121 0,0025 12,0523 2,9768 8,48 7,83 10,88 0 1,17 98 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
34 0,0489 0,0384 11,7963 4,5846 2,24 -1,13 1,24 -0,022 3,50 82 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
35 0,0034 -0,0267 11,4994 4,8102 0,48 1,49 2,4 0,197 3,81 97 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
36 0,1194 0,0222 11,9881 3,7094 6,10 11,75 3,64 -0,049 2,12 143 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
37 0,0778 0,0661 11,3111 3,6676 4,15 -2,75 5,34 0,044 2,71 55 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
38 0,0498 -0,0041 13,0747 4,6158 1,78 5,5 1,59 0,034 2,25 22 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
39 -0,0279 0,0203 11,6310 4,7375 2,95 -0,25 0,7 0,308 3,73 49 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
40 -0,0338 -0,0405 11,8385 4,6160 0,94 1,43 2,35 0,134 3,60 82 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
41 -0,0023 -0,0055 11,0563 4,4311 3,66 2,75 2,29 0,001 3,97 45 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
42 -0,0139 -0,0192 11,7521 3,8940 9,16 4,5 8,57 -0,239 1,58 154 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
43 -0,2608 -0,1574 11,4131 4,7666 2,68 2 2,26 -0,129 3,86 97 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
44 -0,0157 -0,0101 13,1028 4,6362 3,80 -0,25 2,68 -0,142 3,79 22 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
45 0,0203 -0,0360 11,6387 4,7404 1,79 -0,35 0,23 0,304 2,30 49 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
46 0,0547 0,1040 12,4355 4,5198 1,51 0,07 1,98 -0,182 3,82 52 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
47 0,1200 0,1233 11,7867 4,5765 0,34 -0,66 2,11 -0,026 3,64 82 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
48 0,0282 0,0205 11,3066 4,6875 6,08 -1,23 2,43 -0,052 3,79 28 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
49 0,0535 0,0403 11,2472 4,6521 5,42 0,38 4,65 -0,109 3,92 28 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
50 -0,1233 -0,1487 12,4631 3,3432 14,20 3,31 5,57 -0,134 2,01 119 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
51 0,1124 0,0495 12,4631 3,3432 14,20 3,31 5,57 -0,134 2,01 119 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
52 0,0834 0,0230 11,7886 3,9250 8,77 4,5 6,47 -0,507 1,55 154 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
53 -0,1594 -0,1513 12,6443 4,5220 -0,20 -3,933 -0,33 0,075 3,69 148 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
54 0,0249 0,0173 12,6246 4,5381 1,69 -2,983 -0,25 -0,061 3,50 148 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
55 0,0442 0,0392 11,9084 3,8747 1,42 4,79 4,55 -0,105 2,36 155 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
56 -0,0216 -0,0017 11,6038 4,6317 6,65 1,15 1,16 0,183 3,59 89 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
57 -0,0546 -0,0477 11,6164 4,6410 2,93 0,75 2,96 0,159 3,73 89 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
58 -0,0469 0,0004 12,0523 2,9768 8,48 7,83 10,88 0 1,17 98 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
59 -0,0306 -0,0405 11,6310 4,7375 2,95 -0,25 0,7 0,308 3,73 49 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
60 0,0325 0,0492 12,3924 4,4790 0,79 -1,61 1,45 0,027 3,71 52 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
61 0,0643 0,0297 11,9769 3,8217 4,29 8,6 8,44 -0,158 2,37 198 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
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APPENDIX 1b – Variable information for entire data sample: Deal 62-91 
Deal CAR 11 CAR 5 GDP  GDP/ GDP INT INFL EXC POL CULT IND MoP MTB EXP GEO LANG SIZE EM/DV 
number       CAP g     RATE STAB                   
62 0,1247 0,0894 12,0004 2,9360 9,80 11,31 6,37 -0,045 1,35 98 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
63 -0,0749 -0,1728 12,0086 3,7219 -0,33 10,25 4,89 0,167 2,66 143 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
64 -0,0581 -0,0102 11,5315 3,1620 6,01 6 9,78 -0,1 1,41 151 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
65 0,0259 0,0103 12,4577 4,5419 3,70 -1,28 1,58 -0,073 3,50 52 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
66 -0,0234 -0,0586 12,6768 4,5704 2,19 -0,09 0,06 -0,272 3,46 148 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
67 -0,0520 -0,0383 11,5112 4,4965 1,61 2,24 0,47 0,077 3,33 89 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
68 0,0179 -0,0130 11,4430 4,5632 4,45 6,75 1,04 -0,113 2,37 89 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
69 0,0627 0,0123 12,6545 4,5481 2,36 -2,25 -0,01 -0,115 3,77 148 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
70 -0,1068 0,0657 11,6176 4,7270 3,75 0 1,06 -0,144 3,82 49 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
71 0,0732 -0,0097 12,4534 4,5401 -5,15 -2,823 0,31 0,186 3,49 52 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
72 0,0216 -0,0160 12,0518 3,7575 2,73 -3,14 6,64 0,142 3,88 143 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
73 -0,0795 -0,0497 11,8831 3,7273 6,38 5,43 12,68 -0,144 1,25 198 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
74 0,0247 0,0138 11,9527 3,7634 8,18 4,53 9,68 -0,195 1,59 198 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
75 -0,0681 -0,0773 11,9171 3,8001 8,54 10,23 9,01 -0,133 1,64 198 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
76 -0,0244 -0,0166 12,0401 3,7496 7,53 10,5 5,04 0,243 2,51 143 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
77 0,0573 0,0080 11,8411 4,5316 3,19 1,25 2,67 -0,03 3,38 23 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
78 -0,0692 -0,1087 11,9527 3,8001 8,54 10,23 9,01 -0,133 1,64 198 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
79 0,0140 -0,0314 11,9396 3,7875 -7,82 10,32 11,65 -0,135 1,55 198 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
80 0,0374 0,0028 11,9587 3,8052 4,50 7,96 6,68 -0,097 1,59 198 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
81 0,0594 0,0010 11,4443 4,7897 1,99 4,5 3,02 -0,162 3,95 97 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
82 -0,0874 -0,0343 11,9171 3,7634 8,15 4,53 9,68 -0,195 1,59 198 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
83 -0,0407 -0,0898 11,6013 4,6400 3,31 1,91 2,21 -0,016 3,75 89 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
84 0,0073 0,0051 11,2810 4,6722 4,20 -1,17 2,19 -0,022 3,67 28 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
85 -0,0054 0,0483 11,4619 3,7630 3,09 5 4,26 0,134 2,48 55 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
86 0,0838 0,0989 12,3070 3,1944 10,10 1,08 0,98 -0,229 2,14 119 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
87 0,0538 0,0293 11,7552 4,4893 3,85 0,28 4,48 -0,183 3,76 23 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
88 0,0111 0,0413 11,8051 4,5924 2,05 -1,22 1,67 -0,052 3,71 82 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
89 0,1229 0,1645 12,4290 4,5140 3,06 0,8 1,47 -0,15 3,82 52 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
90 -0,0348 -0,0162 13,1285 4,6538 2,67 -1,17 3,23 -0,174 2,99 22 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
91 0,0005 0,0004 11,8051 4,5924 2,05 -1,22 1,67 -0,052 3,71 82 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
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APPENDIX 1b – Variable information for entire data sample: Deal 92-121 
Deal CAR 11 CAR 5 GDP  GDP/ GDP INT INFL EXC POL CULT IND MoP MTB EXP GEO LANG SIZE EM/DV 
number       CAP g     RATE STAB                   
92 -0,0017 0,0002 11,4830 4,8180 2,59 0,5 1,52 -0,035 3,78 97 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
93 0,0544 -0,0455 11,5236 4,6730 2,04 -5,25 0,52 -0,149 3,88 49 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
94 -0,0573 -0,0275 11,7342 4,4621 4,52 -0,5 0,85 -0,194 3,51 23 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
95 0,0040 0,0158 13,0249 4,5843 4,45 0 1,55 0,002 3,32 22 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
96 0,0067 0,0010 11,8935 4,5554 1,65 4,25 1,82 0,21 3,33 23 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
97 -0,0111 -0,0050 11,5554 4,6014 4,23 -2,78 0,37 -0,004 3,83 89 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
98 -0,0813 -0,1409 11,4767 3,7188 5,28 4 3,40 0,079 2,35 55 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
99 -0,1321 -0,0231 11,4554 3,7670 3,62 6,5 11,54 -0,124 2,54 55 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
100 -0,1927 -0,1415 11,3928 3,7726 3,46 4,5 5,28 -0,061 2,53 55 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
101 -0,0458 -0,0777 12,5029 3,3808 9,60 10,25 8,62 0,235 2,66 119 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
102 0,0532 0,0234 12,0086 3,7219 -0,33 4,81 4,89 0,167 2,02 143 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
103 -0,1116 -0,1145 11,6387 4,7404 1,79 -0,25 0,23 0,304 3,79 49 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
104 -0,0488 0,0078 11,7886 3,9250 8,77 4,5 6,47 -0,507 1,55 154 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
105 -0,1185 -0,0356 11,6310 4,7375 2,95 -0,25 0,7 0,308 3,73 49 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
106 0,0476 -0,0097 12,6673 4,5620 4,65 1,001 -0,28 0,294 3,35 148 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
107 -0,1372 -0,2085 12,4355 4,5198 1,51 0,07 1,98 -0,182 3,82 52 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
108 0,0806 0,0653 11,9129 4,5641 2,43 2,53 3,39 0,333 3,43 23 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
109 -0,0227 -0,0291 12,0523 2,9768 8,48 7,83 10,88 0 1,17 98 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
110 -0,1955 -0,1227 12,0004 2,9360 9,80 11,31 6,37 -0,045 1,35 98 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
111 -0,0280 -0,0046 13,1413 4,6478 1,85 -0,37 3,16 0,068 3,10 22 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
112 0,1292 0,1399 11,4546 4,5079 2,71 4,53 0,52 -0,031 1,59 89 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
113 -0,0993 -0,1356 11,9030 3,6491 2,66 -2,06 8,45 -0,687 3,88 143 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
114 0,0266 -0,0102 12,3535 3,2383 11,30 12,75 4,4 -0,081 2,79 119 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
115 -0,0461 -0,0173 11,9171 3,7634 8,15 1,12 9,68 -0,195 2,02 198 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
116 -0,0093 0,0447 11,6013 4,6400 3,31 1,91 2,21 -0,016 3,75 89 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
117 0,0080 -0,0450 10,9335 4,3603 2,94 -1,25 1,19 -0,062 3,75 45 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
118 0,0382 0,0237 11,2472 4,6521 5,42 0,38 4,65 -0,109 3,92 28 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
119 -0,0984 -0,0127 11,1592 4,6201 10,97 3,24 1,64 -0,156 3,45 28 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
120 -0,0541 -0,0457 11,8864 4,5563 3,77 -0,49 4,35 0,092 3,94 23 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
121 -0,1174 -0,0916 12,3924 4,4790 0,79 -1,61 1,45 0,027 3,71 52 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX 1b – Variable information for entire data sample: Deal 122-151 
Deal CAR 11 CAR 5 GDP  GDP/ GDP INT INFL EXC POL CULT IND MoP MTB EXP GEO LANG SIZE EM/DV 
number       CAP g     RATE STAB                   
122 0,0450 0,0185 11,3385 3,6802 3,67 0,5 9,16 -0,168 3,78 55 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
123 0,0359 -0,0275 11,4830 4,8180 2,59 4,25 1,52 -0,035 2,18 97 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
124 -0,0087 -0,0297 11,3509 4,7133 4,97 2,53 4,88 0,016 3,66 28 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
125 0,0091 0,0179 11,8664 3,6438 3,37 12,75 6,93 0,457 2,25 143 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
126 -0,0600 -0,0777 12,0947 3,0145 10,26 9,67 11,99 0,079 1,27 98 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
127 0,1454 0,0946 11,7599 4,5609 4,68 -0,6 2,19 -0,156 4,01 82 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
128 -0,0784 -0,0584 11,6012 4,7270 3,75 -2,25 1,06 -0,144 3,77 49 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
129 0,2078 0,1540 11,4562 3,1048 5,69 4,75 10,45 -0,186 1,02 151 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
130 0,0320 0,0007 11,9594 3,8934 -4,70 6,61 5,3 -0,165 1,80 155 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
131 0,0266 -0,0192 13,1413 4,6478 1,85 -0,37 3,16 0,068 3,10 22 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
132 0,0197 0,0301 11,3316 3,0241 -13,13 7,01 58,39 0,072 3,94 151 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
133 -0,1714 0,0388 11,9099 4,2283 4,62 -0,75 3,59 -0,041 2,90 173 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
134 -0,0219 -0,0498 11,3928 3,7188 5,28 4 3,40 0,079 2,35 55 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
135 -0,0545 -0,0313 13,1285 4,6538 2,67 -1,17 3,23 -0,174 2,99 22 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
136 -0,0293 -0,0363 11,6387 4,7404 1,79 -0,25 0,23 0,304 3,79 49 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
137 0,0925 0,0288 11,7886 3,8940 9,16 4,5 8,57 -0,239 1,58 154 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
138 -0,0069 -0,0532 11,7521 3,9250 8,77 4,5 6,47 -0,507 1,55 154 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
139 -0,0215 0,0625 11,3082 4,6648 -1,06 9,1 -0,95 0,163 3,48 28 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
140 -0,0091 0,0053 11,5877 3,7747 6,16 22,25 44,96 -0,372 1,63 154 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
141 0,0433 0,0020 12,0004 2,9360 9,80 11,31 6,37 -0,045 1,35 98 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
142 -0,0026 -0,0039 12,0100 3,7272 5,17 8,25 5,66 0,008 2,21 143 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
143 -0,1309 -0,1857 11,3511 3,6873 2,95 2,49 5,86 -0,01 3,41 55 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
144 0,0103 0,0256 11,8345 4,6139 1,53 2,75 1,28 0,163 2,17 82 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
145 -0,0049 -0,1213 11,3299 4,7007 5,51 -1,19 3,94 -0,073 3,64 28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
146 -0,0208 -0,0164 11,4165 3,7377 5,60 5,5 4,64 -0,167 2,55 55 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
147 0,0111 -0,0150 12,9870 4,5566 3,80 -1,75 2,93 -0,027 3,37 22 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
148 0,0121 0,0225 12,4078 4,4938 1,86 -1,01 0,94 -0,024 3,67 52 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
149 0,0102 0,0133 11,1592 4,6201 10,97 -0,49 1,64 -0,156 3,94 28 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
150 0,0839 0,0551 11,6489 3,8238 9,36 7,52 10,58 -0,315 1,66 154 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
151 0,1237 0,2010 11,9598 2,9015 9,26 9 6,15 -0,153 1,44 98 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
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APPENDIX 2 – Diagnostic testing of assumptions in regression model 
 
Test 1 – y can be written as a linear function of several explanatory variables, an intercept 
(α) and an error term (ε) 
This assumption is put forward in Westerlund (2005) and implies that the dependent variable, 
y, can be written as a linear function of several explanatory variables, an intercept (α) and an 
error term (ε). The assumption means that there are not any omitted explanatory variables, 
which would be significant in the model. If there are omitted variables it would result in an 
OLS estimation which is not unbiased. Some variables were not possible to examine with 
consideration to the data collection, which explains the presence of omitted explanatory 
variables. Nevertheless, the authors deemed that the model was still the most appropriate 
explanatory model. Special consideration was therefore taken into account for the analysis of 
the results. A Ramsey RESET-test is displayed in figure 2.1.  
 
Test 2 – Inclusion of a constant in the regression 
The second assumption implies that the error term (ε) on average should be zero. By 
including a constant in the regression the authors considered the assumption to be satisfied in 
accordance to Brooks (2008).  
 
Test 3 - Heteroscedasticity 
The third assumption implies that the error term (ε) is homoscedastic, which means that the 
variance of all the error terms is constant (Brooks, 2008). The assumption that the error term 
has the same variance for all the observations in the sample is tested by examining for 
heteroscedasticity. If the assumption is true then ε is homoscedastic, whereas if it is false then 
ε is heteroscedastic there is a problem in the sample. Heteroscedasticity will cause the OLS 
estimation for the regression will be unbiased (Westerlund, 2005). The test is therefore 
important since heteroscedasticity means that the hypotheses no longer can be tested with the 
parameters of the model. It is not uncommon to in use a graph to illustrate the OLS residual, 
(figure 2.2)  and perform a White-test (figure 2.3) (Westerlund, 2005).  
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The White-test is used to find a range of different types of heteroscedasticity. Null hypotheses 
were used to test and since it involves numerous parameters simultaneously the authors 
applied the F-test (Westerlund, 2005). When the test was performed on the sample, three 
types of heteroscedasticity were displayed. F-statistic, Obs*R-squared and Scaled explained 
SS. As seen in figure 2.3, the null hypothesis was rejected at  1 percent  significance level, for 
all three tests. Therefore the authors can conclude that there was heteroscadicity in the 
sample. (Brooks 2008). Thus, the authors corrected for this problem by correcting the 
regression in Eviews by using a ”White” adjustment. 
 
Test 4 – Autocorrelation 
The fourth assumption states that the covariance for the errors terms should be zero over time, 
which means there they the errors terms should be uncorrelated. The assumption is verified by 
testing for autocorrelation. There are is a range of tests that can be performed, such as the 
Durbin-Watson test (Brooks, 2008). The data sample was not examined over time and there 
was no relationship between two observations since they were randomly selected from the 
sample. As a result, the authors concluded that there was no reason to believe that there would 
be any autocorrelation in the sample. 
Test 5 - Multicollinearity 
The fifth assumption implies that the independent variables are not random, non-stochastic 
(Brooks, 2008). For this reason the independent variables cannot be expressed as exact linear 
functions of each other (Westerlund, 2005). This can be examined by making sure that the 
explanatory and dummy variables are not correlated with one and another.  The authors 
therefore chose to investigate whether there was any multicollinearity between the all 
variables. According to Brooks (2008), any levels of correlation under 0.8 are unproblematic. 
The Correlations tables can be observed in figure 2.4. None of the variables exceed the 
recommended correlation limit, apart from one. The correlation between GDP per capita and 
the dummy variable EM_DV was 0.903, which the authors considered close enough to the 
recommended value of 0.8 and the variable is still included in the regression. The reason for 
high correlations can be explained since some of the variables are overlapping. 
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Test 6 – Normally distributed error terms 
The sixth and final assumption presumes that the error term ε is normally distributed (Brooks, 
2008). If the assumption holds it means that the authors can make inferences from the 
parameters of the regression model with the help of confidence levels and hypothesis testing 
based on the t-distribution (Westerlund, 2005). The test is called Jarque-Bera and measures 
the normality among the error terms. The test also examines the skewness and kurtosis in the 
residuals’ distribution to see if it resembles a normally distributed sample. If the sample size 
is large enough, typically larger than 100 observations, then non-normality is usually not a 
problem. Since the sample for this study included 151 observations and the study exceeds this 
lower limit, therefore criteria is considered to be satisfied in accordance with the central limit 
theorem. 
The normality test can be seen in figure 2.5. Skewness refers to the extent to which the 
distributions of residuals are not symmetrical. Kurtosis measures how thickness of the tails. 
According to Brooks (2008), a normally distributed sample should have a skewness value of 0 
and a kurtosis value of 3. The sample in the study has a skewness of -0.18 and a kurtosis of 
3.69 and although these values are not perfectly optimal the size of the overall sample 
automatically solves the non-normality problem. 
As evident from figure 2.5 a very few of the observations lie in the far corners of the 
distribution. These can sometimes be referred outliers, which indicate extreme values. In such 
an event, it is not possible to assume a normally distributed sample (Brooks, 2008).  Since the 
authors did not consider the values to be extreme, or detected any measurement errors, there 
was no reason to exclude them from the sample.  
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Figure 2.1 – Ramsey RESET-test 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
     
 Value df Probability  
t-statistic  2.558070  133  0.0116  
F-statistic  6.543723 (1, 133)  0.0116  
Likelihood ratio  7.252356  1  0.0071  
     
     
F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df Mean Squares  
Test SSR  288.6097  1  288.6097  
Restricted SSR  6154.551  134  45.92948  
Unrestricted SSR  5865.941  133  44.10482  
Unrestricted SSR  5865.941  133  44.10482  
     
     
LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -494.1886  134   
Unrestricted LogL -490.5624  133   
     
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
CULT -0.019058 0.026976 -0.706472 0.4811 
EM_DV -4.836542 3.614909 -1.337943 0.1832 
EXC_RATE 0.148811 3.700254 0.040216 0.9680 
EXP01 0.112298 1.349725 0.083200 0.9338 
GDP_G 0.096730 0.199307 0.485329 0.6282 
GEO -1.256380 1.923863 -0.653051 0.5149 
IND 0.056099 1.145479 0.048974 0.9610 
INFL 0.059401 0.121651 0.488286 0.6262 
INT 0.069151 0.199987 0.345777 0.7301 
LANG -0.193079 1.610021 -0.119923 0.9047 
LN_GDP -1.182607 1.567946 -0.754240 0.4520 
LN_GDP_CAP -0.849646 2.863284 -0.296738 0.7671 
MOP 0.171888 1.285915 0.133670 0.8939 
MTB -2.063158 1.306884 -1.578685 0.1168 
POL_STAB -1.255162 1.154514 -1.087178 0.2789 
SIZE -0.484643 1.394446 -0.347553 0.7287 
C 25.25942 25.13852 1.004809 0.3168 
FITTED^2 -0.201088 0.078609 -2.558070 0.0116 
     
     
R-squared 0.183109    Mean dependent var -1.066715 
Adjusted R-squared 0.078694    S.D. dependent var 6.918964 
S.E. of regression 6.641146    Akaike info criterion 6.735926 
Sum squared resid 5865.941    Schwarz criterion 7.095602 
Log likelihood -490.5624    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.882045 
F-statistic 1.753669    Durbin-Watson stat 1.839089 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.040760    
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Figure 2.2 – Illustration of the residuals for the regression of the entire sample 
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Figure 2.3- Heteroskedasticity Test: White 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 2.416928    Prob. F(16,134) 0.0032 
Obs*R-squared 33.81751    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.0057 
Scaled explained SS 35.86417    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.0030 
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 151   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 349.9456 124.3948 2.813185 0.0056 
CULT^2 -0.004285 0.002458 -1.743548 0.0835 
EM_DV^2 -67.15612 33.08360 -2.029892 0.0443 
EXC_RATE^2 -56.92629 96.48966 -0.589973 0.5562 
EXP01^2 -15.14517 12.48073 -1.213484 0.2271 
GDP_G^2 -0.042349 0.187029 -0.226432 0.8212 
GEO^2 0.313165 17.28018 0.018123 0.9856 
IND^2 8.751454 10.77748 0.812013 0.4182 
INFL^2 -0.019589 0.019365 -1.011593 0.3136 
INT^2 -0.053120 0.118293 -0.449056 0.6541 
LANG^2 -27.84418 14.94815 -1.862717 0.0647 
LN_GDP^2 -0.513144 0.597141 -0.859335 0.3917 
LN_GDP_CAP^2 -10.91380 3.671961 -2.972199 0.0035 
MOP^2 -22.72197 12.01624 -1.890938 0.0608 
MTB^2 -2.347704 10.73166 -0.218764 0.8272 
POL_STAB^2 2.255311 1.904701 1.184076 0.2385 
SIZE^2 32.00352 11.51056 2.780361 0.0062 
     
     
R-squared 0.223957    Mean dependent var 40.75862 
Adjusted R-squared 0.131295    S.D. dependent var 67.11336 
S.E. of regression 62.55257    Akaike info criterion 11.21562 
Sum squared resid 524318.3    Schwarz criterion 11.55531 
Log likelihood -829.7791    Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.35362 
F-statistic 2.416928    Durbin-Watson stat 2.055612 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003190    
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Figure 2.4 – Correlation tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary  
Sample: 1 151   
Included observations: 151  
    
      Correlation Probability 
    
    CAR_5  CAR_5 1.000000 -----  
CULT  CAR_5 -0.067149 0.4127 
CULT  CULT 1.000000 -----  
EM_DV  CAR_5 -0.018268 0.8238 
EM_DV  CULT -0.278463 0.0005 
EM_DV  EM_DV 1.000000 -----  
EXC_RATE  CAR_5 -0.008412 0.9184 
EXC_RATE  CULT 0.085006 0.2994 
EXC_RATE  EM_DV -0.228729 0.0047 
EXC_RATE  EXC_RATE 1.000000 -----  
EXP01  CAR_5 0.041201 0.6155 
EXP01  CULT 0.014670 0.8581 
EXP01  EM_DV 0.016222 0.8433 
EXP01  EXC_RATE -0.057278 0.4848 
EXP01  EXP01 1.000000 -----  
GDP_G  CAR_5 0.036585 0.6556 
GDP_G  CULT -0.063662 0.4374 
GDP_G  EM_DV 0.373682 0.0000 
GDP_G  EXC_RATE -0.321470 0.0001 
GDP_G  EXP01 -0.004291 0.9583 
GDP_G  GDP_G 1.000000 -----  
GEO  CAR_5 -0.041616 0.6119 
GEO  CULT 0.260767 0.0012 
GEO  EM_DV -0.419165 0.0000 
GEO  EXC_RATE -0.105570 0.1970 
GEO  EXP01 0.087394 0.2860 
GEO  GDP_G -0.102037 0.2125 
GEO  GEO 1.000000 -----  
IND  CAR_5 0.005403 0.9475 
IND  CULT -0.053414 0.5148 
IND  EM_DV 0.034819 0.6712 
IND  EXC_RATE -0.146568 0.0725 
IND  EXP01 0.061107 0.4561 
IND  GDP_G 0.051146 0.5328 
IND  GEO 0.097373 0.2343 
IND  IND 1.000000 -----  
INFL  CAR_5 0.022720 0.7819 
INFL  CULT -0.078904 0.3355 
INFL  EM_DV 0.500127 0.0000 
INFL  EXC_RATE -0.208531 0.0102 
INFL  EXP01 -0.006307 0.9387 
INFL  GDP_G -0.045427 0.5797 
INFL  GEO -0.124240 0.1285 
INFL  IND 0.116608 0.1539 
INFL  INFL 1.000000 -----  
INT  CAR_5 0.085899 0.2943 
INT  CULT -0.093450 0.2538 
INT  EM_DV 0.651912 0.0000 
INT  EXC_RATE 0.023710 0.7726 
INT  EXP01 -0.039291 0.6319 
INT  GDP_G 0.280286 0.0005 
INT  GEO -0.256583 0.0015 
INT  IND 0.080771 0.3242 
INT  INFL 0.494155 0.0000 
INT  INT 1.000000 -----  
LANG  CAR_5 0.056419 0.4914 
LANG  CULT -0.151085 0.0641 
LANG  EM_DV -0.085732 0.2953 
LANG  EXC_RATE 0.037874 0.6443 
 
    
      Correlation Probability 
    
    IND  CAR_5 0.005403 0.9475 
IND  CULT -0.053414 0.5148 
IND  EM_DV 0.034819 0.6712 
IND  EXC_RATE -0.146568 0.0725 
IND  EXP01 0.061107 0.4561 
IND  GDP_G 0.051146 0.5328 
IND  GEO 0.097373 0.2343 
IND  IND 1.000000 -----  
INFL  CAR_5 0.022720 0.7819 
INFL  CULT -0.078904 0.3355 
INFL  EM_DV 0.500127 0.0000 
INFL  EXC_RATE -0.208531 0.0102 
INFL  EXP01 -0.006307 0.9387 
INFL  GDP_G -0.045427 0.5797 
INFL  GEO -0.124240 0.1285 
INFL  IND 0.116608 0.1539 
INFL  INFL 1.000000 -----  
INT  CAR_5 0.085899 0.2943 
INT  CULT -0.093450 0.2538 
INT  EM_DV 0.651912 0.0000 
INT  EXC_RATE 0.023710 0.7726 
INT  EXP01 -0.039291 0.6319 
INT  GDP_G 0.280286 0.0005 
INT  GEO -0.256583 0.0015 
INT  IND 0.080771 0.3242 
INT  INFL 0.494155 0.0000 
INT  INT 1.000000 -----  
LANG  CAR_5 0.056419 0.4914 
LANG  CULT -0.151085 0.0641 
LANG  EM_DV -0.085732 0.2953 
LANG  EXC_RATE 0.037874 0.6443 
LANG  EXP01 -0.113665 0.1646 
LANG  GDP_G 0.162838 0.0457 
LANG  GEO -0.432605 0.0000 
LANG  IND -0.018387 0.8227 
LANG  INFL -0.047476 0.5627 
LANG  INT -0.015276 0.8523 
LANG  LANG 1.000000 -----  
LN_GDP  CAR_5 0.046937 0.5671 
LN_GDP  CULT -0.375022 0.0000 
LN_GDP  EM_DV -0.062717 0.4443 
LN_GDP  EXC_RATE -0.028112 0.7319 
LN_GDP  EXP01 0.015997 0.8454 
LN_GDP  GDP_G 0.004215 0.9590 
LN_GDP  GEO -0.334596 0.0000 
LN_GDP  IND -0.027943 0.7334 
LN_GDP  INFL -0.112059 0.1707 
LN_GDP  INT -0.041043 0.6168 
LN_GDP  LANG -9.00E-06 0.9999 
LN_GDP  LN_GDP 1.000000 -----  
MOP  CAR_5 0.041497 0.6129 
MOP  CULT 0.083837 0.3061 
MOP  EM_DV 0.036381 0.6574 
MOP  EXC_RATE 0.039669 0.6287 
MOP  EXP01 0.130554 0.1101 
MOP  GDP_G -0.051195 0.5324 
MOP  GEO -0.090201 0.2707 
MOP  IND -0.079215 0.3336 
MOP  INFL 0.100852 0.2179 
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Figure 2.4 – Correlation tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
      Correlation Probability 
    
    LN_GDP  CAR_5 0.046937 0.5671 
LN_GDP  CULT -0.375022 0.0000 
LN_GDP  EM_DV -0.062717 0.4443 
LN_GDP  EXC_RATE -0.028112 0.7319 
LN_GDP  EXP01 0.015997 0.8454 
LN_GDP  GDP_G 0.004215 0.9590 
LN_GDP  GEO -0.334596 0.0000 
LN_GDP  IND -0.027943 0.7334 
LN_GDP  INFL -0.112059 0.1707 
LN_GDP  INT -0.041043 0.6168 
LN_GDP  LANG -9.00E-06 0.9999 
LN_GDP  LN_GDP 1.000000 -----  
MOP  CAR_5 0.041497 0.6129 
MOP  CULT 0.083837 0.3061 
MOP  EM_DV 0.036381 0.6574 
MOP  EXC_RATE 0.039669 0.6287 
MOP  EXP01 0.130554 0.1101 
MOP  GDP_G -0.051195 0.5324 
MOP  GEO -0.090201 0.2707 
MOP  IND -0.079215 0.3336 
MOP  INFL 0.100852 0.2179 
MOP  INT 0.141028 0.0841 
MOP  LANG 0.055834 0.4959 
MOP  LN_GDP -0.017156 0.8344 
MOP  MOP 1.000000 -----  
MTB  CAR_5 -0.236678 0.0034 
MTB  CULT 0.016877 0.8370 
MTB  EM_DV -0.056191 0.4932 
MTB  EXC_RATE 0.019115 0.8158 
MTB  EXP01 0.070869 0.3872 
MTB  GDP_G 0.029700 0.7173 
MTB  GEO 0.100721 0.2185 
MTB  IND 0.004108 0.9601 
MTB  INFL 0.031518 0.7009 
MTB  INT 0.012786 0.8762 
MTB  LANG 0.071198 0.3850 
MTB  LN_GDP -0.030262 0.7122 
MTB  MOP -0.022975 0.7795 
MTB  MTB 1.000000 -----  
SIZE  CAR_5 -0.132577 0.1046 
SIZE  CULT 0.154558 0.0581 
SIZE  EM_DV -0.159115 0.0510 
SIZE  EXC_RATE 0.006849 0.9335 
SIZE  EXP01 -0.267397 0.0009 
SIZE  GDP_G 0.010606 0.8972 
SIZE  GEO 0.067021 0.4136 
SIZE  IND 0.027685 0.7358 
SIZE  INFL -0.042668 0.6029 
SIZE  INT -0.096889 0.2366 
SIZE  LANG 0.049491 0.5462 
SIZE  LN_GDP 0.002697 0.9738 
SIZE  MOP -0.183884 0.0238 
SIZE  MTB -0.091504 0.2638 
SIZE  SIZE 1.000000 -----  
LN_GDP_
CAP  EM_DV -0.902776 0.0000 
LN_GDP_
CAP  EXC_RATE 0.179290 0.0276 
LN_GDP_
CAP  EXP01 0.046148 0.5737 
LN_GDP_
CAP  GDP_G -0.408702 0.0000 
LN_GDP_
CAP  GEO 0.516501 0.0000 
 
    
      Correlation Probability 
    
    LN_GDP_CAP  CAR_5 -0.030455 0.7105 
LN_GDP_CAP  CULT 0.184346 0.0235 
LN_GDP_CAP  EM_DV -0.902776 0.0000 
LN_GDP_CAP  EXC_RATE 0.179290 0.0276 
LN_GDP_CAP  EXP01 0.046148 0.5737 
LN_GDP_CAP  GDP_G -0.408702 0.0000 
LN_GDP_CAP  GEO 0.516501 0.0000 
LN_GDP_CAP  IND 0.018019 0.8262 
LN_GDP_CAP  INFL -0.508745 0.0000 
LN_GDP_CAP  INT -0.650822 0.0000 
LN_GDP_CAP  LANG -0.051769 0.5279 
LN_GDP_CAP  LN_GDP 0.001030 0.9900 
LN_GDP_CAP  MOP -0.012257 0.8813 
LN_GDP_CAP  MTB 0.031378 0.7021 
LN_GDP_CAP  SIZE 0.116475 0.1544 
LN_GDP_CAP  LN_GDP_CAP 1.000000 -----  
POL_STAB  CAR_5 -0.088667 0.2790 
POL_STAB  CULT 0.169163 0.0379 
POL_STAB  EM_DV -0.764645 0.0000 
POL_STAB  EXC_RATE 0.210087 0.0096 
POL_STAB  EXP01 0.026034 0.7510 
POL_STAB  GDP_G -0.447427 0.0000 
POL_STAB  GEO 0.274414 0.0007 
POL_STAB  IND -0.039677 0.6286 
POL_STAB  INFL -0.340234 0.0000 
POL_STAB  INT -0.697855 0.0000 
POL_STAB  LANG 0.016195 0.8435 
POL_STAB  LN_GDP -0.080645 0.3249 
POL_STAB  MOP -0.024620 0.7641 
POL_STAB  MTB 0.021273 0.7954 
POL_STAB  SIZE 0.107160 0.1903 
POL_STAB  LN_GDP_CAP 0.766304 0.0000 
POL_STAB  POL_STAB 1.000000 -----  
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1 151
Observations 151
Mean       1.54e-15
Median   0.349571
Maximum  17.06093
Minimum -20.70773
Std. Dev.   6.405493
Skewness  -0.182088
Kurtosis   3.693354
Jarque-Bera  3.859080
Probability  0.145215
Figure 2.5 – Distribution of error terms 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Developing markets - Fading Fashion of Finance 
 
Developing countries, also referred to as 
emerging markets, have quickly become a 
key driver in international growth. 
Investors have benefit from investing in 
markets with high current growth and 
prospects of a bright future. Even though it 
is a relatively new phenomenon, public 
investors have overweighed their portfolios 
with developing market funds. Large 
corporations have already discovered the 
benefits and most US firms do well due to 
growth in their 
foreign markets. 
However, during 
the past few 
years, it seems 
like developing 
markets have 
gone out of 
fashion.  
 
JIM O'Neill, formerly at Goldman Sachs, 
coined the BRIC acronym in November 
2001 as a means of debating the growing 
economic importance of emerging markets. 
The four countries he chose were Brazil, 
Russia, India and China and later on South 
Africa was added to form BRICS. After 
the success of BRICS, MIKT (Mexico, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey) was 
introduced a few years later. They were 
considered to be an investment triumph but 
recently, the success has faded causing 
shareholder wealth destruction.   
 
Managers’ ambitions to realize synergies 
and growth have caused some of the 
largest failures in corporate history. The 
perhaps most infamous cross-border 
merger and acquisition deals, referred to as 
“Transatlantic 
car crash”, took 
place in May 
1998. Daimler-
Benz agreed to 
acquire one of 
Detroit’s big 
three 
automakers, 
Chrysler, at a 
deal originally valued at a staggering $40 
billion. Nine years and billions of dollars 
of losses later, Chrysler was sold off for a 
mere $6 billion. The case begs the 
question; why value can be destroyed for 
acquiring shareholders in CBM&A 
transactions?  
 
 
 
            In fashion, one day you are in, the next you are out 
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One focus for research was for long the 
motives behind CBM&A deals. After 
discovering that the main underlying factor 
was realizing synergy effects, factors 
affecting the value destruction instead 
became the centre of attention. An 
explanation to why some CBM&A deals 
are successful and some are not, might be 
the difference in economic and cultural 
conditions of the target company. This 
shed light to the fact that firms, who are 
faced with the impending decision whether 
or not to expand internationally, and 
engage in CBM&A, need to consider the 
conditions of the target country.  
 
New research evaluating how the market 
responds to the announcement of a 
CBM&A transaction for acquiring 
shareholders and thereby examining the 
extent to which macroeconomic & cultural 
factors influence shareholder value 
creation, show that the target country 
indeed plays a noteworthy role and that on 
average, investments in developing 
countries does not create any significant 
value for the acquiring shareholders. 
However, after analysing 151 CBM&A 
transactions performed by UK acquirers on 
19 foreign targets over 16 years taken into 
account 16 firm, deal, economic, political 
and cultural factors it can be stated that the 
condition of the target company has no 
significant influence on shareholder value 
when investing in developing markets. 
Subsequently, since neither the motive nor 
macroeconomic factors seem to be value 
destroying, investments in developing 
markets appear to simply not be 
worthwhile.  It can be concluded that the 
future of developing markets investments 
indeed looks dark and seem to live up to 
being the new black in finance fashion. 
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